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Abstract 
Obesity is increasingly recognised by policymakers as a threat to public health and 
wellbeing. Despite obesity’s many causes, one commonly cited concern of public health 
advocates is the prevalence of food and beverage advertising. In particular, concerns have 
focused upon the targeting of unhealthy food and beverage advertising towards children. 
The current evidence reveals children’s vulnerability to product advertising and its 
consequential effects upon children’s food-related attitudes and behaviours. Though the 
evidence of a link between food advertising and obesity is equivocal, it is sufficient to make 
the case for a ban on the advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to children. However, 
any advertising restrictions upon commercial advertising must be consistent with the right 
to free expression under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. An analysis of the 
theoretical justifications underlying free speech protections suggests greater leeway 
should be afforded legislators to regulate in the face of a public health crisis. In spite of 
the New Zealand Government’s willingness to rely upon a self-regulatory framework for 
advertising regulation, the success of statutory advertising restrictions internationally 
illustrates the potential for a stronger approach. Though a lack of evidence precludes an 
objective assessment of the efficacy of the current self-regulatory scheme, the theoretical 
incompatibility of self-regulation with the achievement of public health goals underscores 
the need for government-led regulation. Ultimately, the growing threat posed by the obesity 
epidemic, the absence of reasonable alternatives to statutory restrictions and the narrow 
scope of a ban on the advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to children mean the 
suggested ban represents a demonstrably justified limit upon free expression. 
 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,997 words. 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Freedom of expression, 
Bill of Rights, 
Advertising regulation, 
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), or 
Obesity. 
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I Introduction 
Obesity is a public health issue of growing concern for policymakers throughout the global 
regulatory environment. The increasingly wide-felt effects of the obesity epidemic upon 
society have intensified calls for government-led intervention. Public concern has focused 
particularly upon the prevalence of obesity among children. The continuation of obesity 
into adulthood, and its implications for individual health and wellbeing, has led children to 
be identified as an important target for anti-obesity measures. 
 
Despite the many causes of obesity, the promotion of unhealthy foods and beverages is 
consistently cited as contributing to the obesity epidemic. The New Zealand Government 
has historically devolved the regulation of advertising to the advertising industry itself. 
Public health discourse at all levels has repeatedly raised concerns over the predominance 
of such self-regulatory regimes. The stated requirement for more proactive measures 
targeting the obesity epidemic has led to calls for stronger government-led regulation of 
food promotions. Before a more comprehensive framework for advertising regulation can 
be devised, however, it is necessary to consider the effects of regulation upon the right to 
free expression under s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This paper therefore 
considers whether a government-imposed ban upon the advertising of unhealthy foods to 
children could be implemented in accordance with New Zealand’s existing free speech 
protections.  
  
Part II of the paper outlines the extent of the obesity epidemic and highlights the alleged 
connection between food promotion and obesity. In doing so, it reveals children’s 
vulnerability to advertising and its resultant effects upon children’s obesity and obesity-
related behaviours. Despite the absence of evidence directly linking food promotions to 
obesity, the evidence base remains sufficient to present a robust case for more 
comprehensive advertising restrictions. 
 
Part III then assesses the constitutional argument against further regulation by evaluating 
advertisers’ alleged right of commercial expression. An exploration of the arguments raised 
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in support of the protection of commercial expression helps illuminate the constitutional 
foundation upon which existing advertising regulation rests. The influence of these 
considerations upon free speech jurisprudence is evident from the treatment of commercial 
expression within the United States, New Zealand and Canada. These approaches reveal 
that the limited theoretical justifications underlying the protection of commercial 
expression have resulted in a lower level of constitutional protection. Such reduced 
protection therefore provides greater scope for regulatory intervention in circumstances 
conducive to the public interest. 
 
Having identified the threat posed by the emerging obesity epidemic, Part IV outlines the 
existing system of advertising regulation within New Zealand. This discussion reveals 
policymakers’ current resort to self-regulatory measures in order to curb the threat posed 
by obesity. The deficiencies within this self-regulatory framework reinforce the need to 
consider government-led regulation of food and beverage advertising. Part V builds upon 
this by presenting a comparative analysis of advertising regulations within the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Quebec. In addition to demonstrating the potential for regulatory 
reform, these differing approaches underscore the fact that stricter regulation is 
predominantly a function of legislative willingness. The lessons offered by these 
approaches are therefore useful in informing a possible ban on the advertising of unhealthy 
food to children in New Zealand.  
 
Finally, Part VI assesses the constitutionality of an advertising ban in light of New 
Zealand’s existing free speech protections. Drawing upon the existing evidence, the paper 
considers whether a ban upon the advertising of unhealthy foods to children represents a 
demonstrably justified limit upon advertisers’ expression under s 5 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act. Here, the existing evidential uncertainty suggests the proposed ban would 
represent an unjustified limit upon free expression under the Act. Notwithstanding this, a 
compelling argument exists in favour of stronger government regulation. The evidence of 
children’s vulnerability to persuasive food promotions and the costs imposed by obesity 
suggest a more lenient approach should be taken to legislative intervention. The need for 
effective government regulation thus requires that the constitutional protection provided 
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by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act should not be used to cripple the proactive 
development of social health policy. 
 
II The Nature of the Problem 
A The Obesity Epidemic 
1 Childhood obesity – a global health challenge 
Obesity and overweight involves “abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that may impair 
health.”1 At a base level, this fat accumulation stems from a sustained period of surplus 
energy intake.2 Governments’ concern with obesity stems from its short- and long-term 
consequences for both individuals and society generally. Children are an important focus 
of obesity concerns given childhood obesity is a predictor of continued obesity into 
adulthood.3 Children displaying unhealthy eating habits are considered as “laying down 
their food preferences and dietary habits which will continue into adult life.”4 In the long-
term, obesity is considered causally responsible for the increased prevalence of non-
communicable diseases, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.5  
 
Public health fears over the obesity epidemic are exacerbated by the growing prevalence 
of obesity. As of 2010, 43 million preschool children were estimated to be obese globally.6 
Worryingly, these numbers are increasing, with the global prevalence of childhood 
  
1 World Health Organisation “Obesity and Overweight” (March 2013) <www.who.int/mediacentre/>. 
2 Shin-Yi Chou, Inas Rashad and Michael Grossman “Fast-Food Restaurant Advertising on Television and 
its Influence on Childhood Obesity” (2008) 51(4) JLE 599 at 600. 
3 See WR Clarke and RM Lauer “Does Childhood Obesity Track Into Adulthood” (1993) 33(5) Critical 
Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition 423; and Greg Critser Fat Land: How Americans Became the Fattest 
People in the World (Penguin Books, New York, 2003) at 74-75. 
4 See Kath Dalmeny “Food marketing: the role of advertising in child health” (2003) 13(1) Consumer Policy 
Review 2 at 2. 
5 World Health Organisation Population-Based Prevention Strategies for Childhood Obesity: Report of the 
WHO Forum and Technical Meeting (December 2009) at 8; and Delvina Gorton Advertising Food to 
Children: Background Paper (Heart Foundation New Zealand, April 2011) at 1. 
6 Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner and Elaine Borghi “Global prevalence and trends of overweight and 
obesity among preschool children” (2010) 92(5) American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 1257 at 1259. 
4 
 
overweight and obesity rising from 4.2 per cent in 1990 to 6.7 per cent in 2010.7 The 
continued growth in childhood obesity rates and its associated implications for public 
health have led to calls for stronger government policies targeting the epidemic. 
 
Obesity’s position as a global health challenge is evidenced by the emphasis placed upon 
it within the global regulatory environment. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
consistently recognised obesity as a public health issue.8 In its 2010 report on the 
prevention of non-communicable diseases, the WHO stated its objective to reduce the 
modifiable risk factors contributing to non-communicable disease, including factors such 
as excess weight.9 Further discourse at both international and regional levels reinforces the 
need for better management of obesity and its causes.10 
 
2 Obesity in New Zealand 
Whilst the growth of obesity is predominantly evident within developing nations,11 it is not 
a problem from which New Zealand is insulated. A recent report by the New Zealand 
Medical Association identified New Zealand’s obesity rates as fourth worst in the OECD.12 
As of 2013, 31 per cent of New Zealand’s adult population were obese.13 Though obesity 
rates are lower amongst children, the prevalence of childhood obesity is growing rapidly. 
One in nine New Zealand children are now obese, with a further 22 per cent of children 
  
7 de Onis, Blossner and Borghi, above n 6, at 1259. 
8 See Boyd Swinburn and others “The ‘Sydney Principles’ for reducing the commercial promotion of foods 
and beverages to children” (2008) 11(9) Public Health Nutrition 881 at 881. 
9 World Health Organisation Report by the Secretariat on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable 
Diseases: Implementation of the Global Strategy (A63/12, April 2010) at 3. 
10 See generally Anne Matthews and others The Marketing of Unhealthy Food to Children in Europe: A 
Report of Phase 1 of the ‘Children, Obesity and Associated Avoidable Chronic Diseases’ Project (European 
Health Network, 2005); and Corinna Hawkes “Regulating Food Marketing to Young People Worldwide: 
Trends and Policy Drivers” (2007) 97(11) American Journal of Public Health 1962. 
11 See generally de Onis, Blossner and Borghi, above n 6. 
12 New Zealand Medical Association Policy Briefing: Tackling Obesity (May 2014) at 4. See also Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations The State of Food and Agriculture (June 2013) at 78. 
13 New Zealand Medical Association, above n 12, at 8. 
5 
 
considered overweight; an increase of 3 per cent since 2007.14 Obesity rates are also 
consistently higher among poorer socioeconomic groups.15 This illustrates that the health 
consequences of obesity often impact those least resourced to deal with them. 
 
In addition to its effects upon individual health and quality of life, obesity imposes 
significant economic costs upon society. These externalities arise through both the direct 
health costs borne by the healthcare system and the indirect costs imposed upon society 
through lost productivity.16 In 2006, the healthcare burden attributable to excess weight 
and obesity was estimated at $686 million, 4.5 per cent of New Zealand’s total healthcare 
expenditure.17 The individual and collective costs borne by society demonstrate the 
influence of the obesity epidemic within New Zealand. Given its broad ramifications, the 
onus is now upon policymakers to devise more comprehensive means of tackling obesity 
and its causes.  
 
B The Advertising Connection – a Focus upon Children 
Even with obesity’s innumerable causes,18 the promotion of unhealthy foods remains an 
important component of the obesity problem. In 2010 the WHO released a set of 
recommendations seeking to improve states’ regulation of food and beverage promotions.19 
The implementation of children’s marketing codes by self-regulatory groups, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce, further acknowledges the possible impact of food 
promotions upon childhood obesity.20 The regulation of food and beverage advertising 
therefore merits discussion when considering potential avenues for public health 
  
14 Ministry of Health New Zealand Health Survey: Annual Update of Key Findings 2012/13 (December 2013) 
at 43. 
15 New Zealand Medical Association, above n 12, at 8; and Ministry of Health, above n 14, at 43. 
16 New Zealand Medical Association, above n 12, at 7. 
17 New Zealand Medical Association, above n 12, at 7. 
18 See Garry Egger and Boyd Swinburn “An ‘Ecological’ Approach to the Obesity Pandemic” (1997) 
315(7106) British Medical Journal 477 at 479; and Gerard Hastings and others Review of Research on the 
Effects of Food Promotion to Children: Final Report (World Health Organisation, September 2003) at 171. 
19 World Health Organisation, above n 9, at 9-15. 
20 See generally Hawkes, above n 10, at 1968. 
6 
 
intervention. In order to achieve this, it is important to understand the effects of advertising 
and its relationship to obesity. 
 
1 The vulnerability of children 
Children’s susceptibility to advertising represents a significant concern for public health 
advocates. In comparison with adults, children lack the necessary mental faculties to 
identify marketing tactics and scrutinise information.21 This knowledge gap is explained 
by the absence of media literacy among young children.22 Piaget’s three stages of literacy 
provide an understanding of the differing levels of media literacy among young 
consumers.23 Until the age of eight, children are incapable of understanding the persuasive 
intent of advertising.24 Furthermore, it is not until the age of 12 that children can articulate 
an understanding of what advertising is trying to achieve.25 This developmental gap also 
explains the differing effects of marketing techniques upon children of varying ages. 
Younger children are more likely to be persuaded by peripheral marketing stimuli, such as 
colours and sounds.26 Conversely, older children capable of better interpreting messages 
tend to be persuaded by an advertisement’s substantive content.27 These considerations 
demonstrate children’s vulnerability to promotions designed to stimulate demand for 
  
21 Helen Dixon and others “Can counter-advertising reduce pre-adolescent children’s susceptibility to front-
of-package promotions on unhealthy foods? Experimental Research” (2014) 116 Social Science & Medicine 
211 at 212; and M Neil Browne, Lauren Frances Biksacky and Alex Frondorf “Advertising to Children and 
the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Political and Constitutional Limits” (2009) 58 Drake L Rev 67 at 70-71. 
22 Dalmeny, above n 4, at 4; and Patti M Valkenburg “Media and Youth Consumerism” (2000) 27 Journal of 
Adolescent Health 52 at 52-53. 
23 See Sonia Livingstone and Ellen J Helsper “Does Advertising Literacy Mediate the Effects of Advertising 
on Children? A Critical Examination of Two Linked Research Literatures in Relation to Obesity and Food 
Choice” (2006) 56(3) Journal of Communication 560 at 562. 
24 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 562. 
25 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 562. Contrast Lynne Eagle and Anne de Bruin “Advertising 
Restrictions: Protection of the Young and Vulnerable?” (2001) 2(4) Young Consumers 259 at 263, who 
suggest modern children are considerably more media literate than earlier generations. 
26 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 572. 
27 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23 at 572. 
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unhealthy foods. As consumers, children are incapable of interpreting and acting upon such 
messages in a rational manner.28 
 
Collective concerns regarding children’s advertising are intensified by the increasingly 
targeted nature of food promotions. The advertising industry’s emphasis upon young 
consumers stems from their significant current and future market potential.29 This potential 
is evident from figures placing the total purchase influence of children globally at USD 
1.88 trillion.30 The growing influence of young consumers has had significant 
consequences for the advertising industry.31 The importance of new market development 
has seen children’s marketing become a “core part of overall marketing strategy.”32 This 
development has also led to marked changes in the nature of promotions themselves. The 
use of marketing techniques appealing to more hedonistic values, such as humour and taste, 
has become characteristic of an industry oriented towards youth consumerism.33 As a 
result, it is not only children’s vulnerability to advertising that represents a threat, but the 
proclivity of marketers to exploit such vulnerability through their promotions. 
 
The augmented nature of food promotions is further reinforced by the volume and diversity 
of modern advertising. In 2005, the total advertising expenditure for fast food chains and 
restaurants in New Zealand was $67 million.34 A further $57 million was spent on the 
advertising of chocolate, confectionary and aerated drinks.35 This expenditure results in 
significant levels of advertising exposure for products high in fat, sugar and salt. A 2005 
study found that New Zealand children watching two hours of free-to-air television per day 
  
28 See Gorton, above n 5, at 1. 
29 See Browne, Biksacky and Frondorf, above n 21, at 69. 
30 Martin Lindstrom BRANDchild (Kogan Page, London, 2003) at 193. 
31 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 561; and Critser, above n 3, at 114. 
32 See Parke Wilde “Self-regulation and the response to concerns about food and beverage marketing to 
children in the United States” (2009) 67(3) Nutrition Reviews 155 at 160. 
33 See generally Georgina Cairns, Kathryn Angus and Gerard Hastings The Extent, Nature and Effects of 
Food Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence to December 2008 (World Health Organisation, 
December 2009) at 16. 
34 Gorton, above n 5, at 2. 
35 Gorton, above n 5, at 2. 
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would see a total of 7,134 advertisements per year.36 Over the course of an average 
childhood, this level of exposure amounts to seeing 92,000 food advertisements.37 
Children’s exposure is further compounded by the increased fragmentation of marketing 
communications.38 With greater recourse to media such as sponsorship and the internet, 
marketers’ integrated use of promotional media has resulted in a more pervasive marketing 
environment.39 The pervasiveness of modern marketing has thereby exacerbated the 
difficulties faced in protecting children from potentially harmful marketing messages. 
 
2 Food advertising and its effects on children 
Children’s vulnerability to advertising allows marketers to substantially influence children 
and their relationship with food. One of the primary effects of food promotions is to modify 
children’s food-related attitudes and beliefs. Research demonstrates that food 
advertisements have statistically significant effects upon both product preference and 
purchase.40 These effects are amplified by advertising’s effect upon brand recall, with 
children three times more likely to recall an advertised product than adults.41 Advertising’s 
influence upon young consumers is often manifested through ‘pester power’, children’s 
requests to parents for particular products.42 Quantitative research shows that such requests 
are an important determinant of parents’ food choices.43 Given food promotions’ potential 
to normalise unhealthy eating behaviours,44 the attitudinal effects of advertising pose 
significant concerns for children’s health. 
  
36 Nick Wilson and others “Marketing fat and sugar to children on New Zealand television” (2006) 42 
Preventive Medicine 96 at 97. 
37 Wilson and others, above n 36, at 99. 
38 See Hawkes, above n 10, at 1962; and Lindstrom, above n 30, at 194. 
39 See Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 561. 
40 See Hastings and others, above n 18, at 130 and 137; and Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 33, at 28 
and 30. 
41 Lindstrom, above n 30, at 64. See Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 33, at 24. 
42 See Brian M Young, Anne de Bruin and Lynne Eagle “Attitudes of Parents Toward Advertising to Children 
in the UK, Sweden and New Zealand” (2003) 19 Journal of Marketing Management 475 at 484; and Cairns, 
Angus and Hastings, above n 33, at 25. 
43 See United Kingdom Office of Communications Childhood Obesity – Food Advertising in Context (July 
2004) at 58. 
44 See United Kingdom Office of Communications, above n 43, at 111. 
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In addition to its attitudinal effects, food promotions also have a moderate effect upon 
children’s consumption behaviours. Research indicates that the portrayal of food 
consumption cues, such as images of models eating, creates ‘primes’ that stimulate 
corresponding eating behaviours among viewers.45 Further research suggests that these 
primes stimulate consumption of both the advertised brand and energy-dense products 
generally.46 Despite conflicting studies, there remains sufficient evidence that advertising 
exerts a modest direct effect upon children’s food consumption.47 
 
3 The obesity connection 
Though research has identified a direct link between advertising and the food-related 
attitudes and behaviours of children, evidence of a direct link to obesity itself remains 
limited. Several studies have attempted to measure advertising’s effect upon obesity by 
controlling for other moderating factors. One study has suggested a complete ban on 
television advertising would reduce the number of overweight children aged 3–11 by 18 
per cent.48 Other studies, whilst establishing some connection between advertising and 
obesity, suggest advertising explains a minimal degree of the variance in children’s obesity 
rates.49 The evidence base establishing a connection between food promotion and obesity 
is therefore considered circumstantial.50 
 
The difficulties in establishing an evidential connection between food promotion and 
obesity result from obesity’s multiple causes and the difficulty in controlling for these 
  
45 Jennifer L Harris, John A Bargh and Kelly D Brownell “Priming Effects of Television Food Advertising 
on Eating Behaviour” (2009) 28(4) Health Psychology 404 at 405-407. 
46 Moniek Buijzen, Joris Schuurman and Elise Bomhof “Associations between children’s television 
advertising exposure and their food consumption patterns: A household diary-survey study” (2008) 50 
Appetite 231 at 237. 
47 See Hastings and others, above n 18, at 148; and Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 33, at 31. 
48 See Chou, Rashad and Grossman, above n 2, at 616. 
49 See RN Bolton “Modelling the impact of television food advertising on children’s diets” in JH Leigh and 
CR Martin (eds) Current Issues and Research in Advertising (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (MI), 1983) 
173, as cited in Hastings and others, above n 18, at 150. 
50 See Janny M Goris and others “Television Food Advertising and the Prevalence of Childhood Overweight 
and Obesity: a Multicountry Comparison” (2009) 13(7) Public Health Nutrition 1003 at 1003. 
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causes within experimental research. Research targeting links between food promotion and 
obesity is often complicated by the physical inactivity and food consumption associated 
with advertising exposure.51 These factors create uncertainties when attempting to identify 
any exposure-response relationship.52 In addition, the conclusions drawn from research are 
generally based upon correlational data incapable of describing the size and nature of 
advertising’s influence upon obesity.53  
 
The inadequacies of experimental research techniques are compounded by the fact that 
food promotion’s effects are moderated by a variety of environmental factors. Hastings 
surmises the current evidential difficulties facing advocates for stricter advertising 
regulation as follows:54 
 
The relatively small number of studies and the heterogeneous range of other 
dietary influence factors, means that it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions about the size of food promotion’s influence on children relative to 
attitudinal, behavioural, familial, socio-economic and other factors. 
 
Current research therefore lacks an understanding of the extent to which food and beverage 
promotion impacts the prevalence of obesity without the influence of these additional 
environmental factors. These evidential deficiencies form the primary basis for arguments 
that further advertising regulation will not suppress rising obesity concerns.55 
 
Despite this gap in the evidence linking advertising to obesity, the argument for stricter 
regulation of children’s food promotions remains strong. Logic suggests that the sheer 
  
51 T Lobstein and S Dibb “Evidence of a possible link between obesogenic food advertising and child 
overweight” (2005) 6 Obesity Reviews 203 at 204. 
52 Goris and others, above n 50, at 1010. 
53 See Buijzen, Schuurman and Bomhof, above n 46, at 237; and Pimbucha Rumevichientong and others 
“The Impact of Food Advertisements on Changing Eating Behaviours: An Experimental Study” (2014) 44 
Food Policy 59 at 59. 
54 Hastings and others, above n 18, at 171. 
55 See David Ashton “Food advertising and childhood obesity” (2004) 97(2) Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 51 at 51-52. 
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volume of food advertising indicates its effect upon children’s consumption.56 If 
advertising did not have the effect of increasing demand for the products advertised, 
industry groups would be indifferent to its regulation.57 Furthermore, the evident impact of 
obesity upon society underscores the need for more tangible means of addressing the 
obesity epidemic. The existing evidence base demonstrates that advertising exerts some 
influence upon children’s consumption habits. This influence is exacerbated by children’s 
vulnerability to persuasive marketing messages. A precautionary approach to public health 
intervention would enable legislators to regulate on the basis of such evidential 
uncertainty.58 Obesity’s effects upon New Zealand society and the possible evidence of 
advertising’s contribution to the growing epidemic therefore provide a sufficient basis to 
consider further regulatory intervention.  
 
III Freedom of Expression 
A Freedom of Expression and the Concept of Commercial Expression 
1 Advertising and freedom of expression concerns 
The regulation of advertising is inevitably opposed by commercial interests on the grounds 
of freedom of expression. In the context of advertising, these concerns speak to the issue 
of commercial expression and its legitimacy as a constitutionally protected right. That 
advertising restrictions are already accepted in some contexts illustrates that commercial 
expression may be subject to regulation.59 It is therefore important to understand what 
commercial expression is, and the justifications underlying its constitutional protection, in 
order to assess the potential for stronger restrictions upon the advertising of unhealthy 
foods to children. This Part focuses upon three principal arguments raised in support of 
commercial expression protections: the idea that commercial expression furthers individual 
autonomy, the marketplace of ideas concept and the anti-paternalist argument against 
  
56 See Wilde, above n 32, at 161; and Chou, Rashad and Grossman, above n 2, at 602. 
57 See Wilde, above n 32, at 161. 
58 See Rob Moodie and others “Profits and pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and 
ultra-processed food and drink industries” (2013) 381(9867) Lancet 670 at 676.  
59 See for example Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013; and Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. 
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government intervention. It then assesses how these theoretical considerations have 
affected the relevant jurisprudence within Canada, New Zealand and the United States. 
This assessment reveals that the limited theoretical justification for commercial 
expression’s constitutional protection may legitimise stronger government regulation of 
food promotions within New Zealand.  
  
2 What is commercial expression? 
Definitional issues have consistently plagued the commercial expression debate since its 
beginning.60 Some expression, such as advertising, appears paradigmatic of commercial 
expression. The potential breadth of commercial expression, however, precludes the 
adoption of any definition that turns on the expression’s medium or form.61 These 
difficulties explain courts’ reluctance to adopt a precise definition of commercial 
expression.62 
 
A popular approach towards defining commercial expression has been to analyse the 
motives of the speaker.63 Sharpe suggests commercial expression is distinguished by 
messages that propose or entice a specific decision on behalf of the recipient.64 This 
motives-based approach is commonly reflected within judicial conceptions of commercial 
expression. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
the United States Supreme Court defined ‘pure’ commercial expression as expression that 
communicates the idea that “I will sell you the X [product] at the Y price.”65 Adopting a 
broader definition, Pittsburgh Press Co v Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations held 
  
60 See Colin R Munro “The Value of Commercial Speech” (2003) 62(1) CLJ 134 at 149. 
61 See Munro, above n 60, at 150-153. See Nike Inc v Kasky 539 US 654123 (2003) and Markt Intern & 
Beerman v Germany (1990) 12 EHRR 161 as examples of the potential breadth of commercial expression. 
62 See S Shiffrin “The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First 
Amendment” (1983) 78 NWULR 1212 at 1213; and Roger A Shiner Freedom of Commercial Expression 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 6. 
63 See TM Scanlon “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression” (1979) 40 U Pitt L Rev 519 at 
540. 
64 Robert J Sharpe “Commercial Expression and the Charter” (1987) 37(3) UTLJ 229 at 230. 
65 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc 425 US 748 (1976) at 761 
per Blackmun J. 
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that commercial expression does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”66 Such 
approaches place substantial emphasis upon the economic interests of the speaker and their 
relevant audience.67 
 
Despite the attractiveness of a motives-based approach, inherent difficulties in its 
application remain. Munro suggests the difficulty in distinguishing intent in cases of 
commercial expression means this approach risks blurring the distinction between other 
categories of protected speech.68 In particular, artists often exercise their right of artistic 
expression for the purpose of realising a profit. A motives-based approach to categorising 
expression therefore risks chilling artistic expression of this nature. These difficulties 
illustrate that, whilst reference to an economic purpose serves as a useful “touchstone” for 
‘pure’ commercial expression, its ill-defined scope precludes a cohesive definition.69 
 
The difficulty in formulating a broadly applicable definition of commercial expression 
raises questions over the logic of classifying it as a separate category of expression. The 
inability to distinguish between artistic and commercial expression potentially undermines 
the categorisation of certain commercial activities, such as advertising. The apparent 
inconsistency of a categorical approach with modern ‘lifestyle’ advertising that does not 
propose a specific transaction presents difficulties when attempting to define expression.70 
With substantial investment often involved in producing advertisements, advertising 
content may ultimately merit protection on the grounds of artistic merit, regardless of its 
apparent commercial bent.  The task of extricating the separate commercial and non-
commercial elements of expression illustrates the difficulties posed by a categorical 
  
66 Pittsburgh Press Co v Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations 413 US 376 (1973) at 385. 
67 See Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 396; and Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York 447 US 557 (1980) at 561. 
68 Munro, above n 60, at 154. See also Keith Dubick “Commercial Expression: A ‘Second-Class’ Freedom?” 
(1996) 60 Sask L Rev 91 at 96. 
69 See Dubick, above n 68, at 93. 
70 See Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner “Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?” (1990) 76(4) Va L Rev 627 
at 639; and Shiner, above n 62, at 7. 
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approach. Some commentators have suggested this necessitates that commercial 
expression be protected in a manner commensurate with other forms of speech.71  
 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, advertising is commonly accepted as an example of pure 
commercial expression.72 Contemporary free speech jurisprudence illustrates courts’ 
predilection for a more inclusive definition of expression that includes commercial 
expression to the extent that it is accepted as such.73 Commercial expression is thus well 
established as a form of protected expression. It is therefore important to identify the 
precise level of protection afforded this expression in order to evaluate the constitutionality 
of more restrictive advertising regulations. 
 
B The Argument for the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Expression 
1 Autonomy-based arguments 
Freedom of expression is widely recognised as enabling personal autonomy and self-
fulfilment.74 The consideration of personal autonomy in the context of commercial 
expression, however, is prone to debate. Many critics contend that the autonomous values 
which merit protection are not engaged in a commercial context.75 Shiner conceives of 
personal autonomy as a value for “natural persons.”76 This view of autonomy appears 
consistent with the theoretical conception of free expression traditionally presented within 
liberal speech theory. Despite this view, modern legal systems have increasingly evolved 
to attribute anthropomorphic concepts to corporations. The concept of independent legal 
personality supports the argument that autonomy values should be attributed to corporate 
  
71 See Kozinski and Banner, above n 70, at 648. 
72 See generally Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927. 
73 See Shiner, above n 62, at 8. 
74 See Thomas I Emerson The System of Freedom of Expression (Random House, New York, 1970) at 6; and 
Shiner, above n 62, at 166. 
75 See Shiner, above n 62, at 168-169; and Sharpe, above n 64, at 236. For a judicial discussion of this 
criticism see also RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 3 SCR 199 at [72] per La Forest 
J dissenting. 
76 Shiner, above n 62, at 189. 
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entities.77 Notwithstanding this fact, other commentators have suggested that corporations’ 
economic motives preclude their characterisation as autonomous beings.78 Although the 
case for corporate autonomy is arguable, the prevailing belief remains that commercial 
expression does not significantly advance the autonomy of the expresser.79 It is therefore 
necessary to identify some other basis for the autonomy argument. 
 
Autonomy-based arguments for commercial speech protection derive strong support from 
receivers’ reciprocal interest in information. Freedom of expression is universally 
recognised as encapsulating the rights of receivers.80 In upholding the constitutional 
protection of commercial expression, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ford v Quebec 
(Attorney General) emphasised commercial expression’s role in enabling informed 
decision-making, an important aspect of personal autonomy.81 Sharpe suggests that, as 
consumers’ choices are a manifestation of autonomy, commercial expression that informs 
these choices may merit protection.82 In this sense, commercial expression is said to 
enhance autonomy both on an instrumental basis and through its intrinsic value in allowing 
consumers to control their own destiny.83 
 
Despite receivers’ interest in commercial expression, it is unclear whether the information 
conveyed bears any relation to personal autonomy. Shiner advocates that not all choices 
can be said to reflect autonomy,84 citing a disconnect between informed economic choice 
and the concept of individual self-realisation.85 Despite widespread judicial recognition of 
  
77 See Companies Act 1993, s 15. In some jurisdictions, the concept of corporate autonomy is reflected in the 
offence of corporate manslaughter, see for example Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 (UK). 
78 See C Edwin Baker “Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom” (1976) 62 Iowa L Rev 1 
at 13; and Ian Cram Contested Words: Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Speech in Liberal Democracies 
(Ashgate, Aldershot (UK), 2006) at 175. 
79 See Shiner, above n 62, at 168-169. 
80 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 223; and Virginia Board, above n 65, at 762-763 per Blackmun J. 
81 Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 760. 
82 Sharpe, above n 64, at 237 and 259. 
83 See Martin H Redish “The Value of Free Speech” (1982) 130(3) U Pa L Rev 591 at 620-621. 
84 Shiner, above n 62, at 230. 
85 Shiner, above n 62 at 236. 
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the importance of economic choice,86 commentators question whether economic self-
realisation can be equated with self-realisation that pertains to liberty and personal 
discovery.87 When expression is viewed as “an integral part of the development of ideas, 
of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self,”88 the economic motives behind 
commercial expression appear inconsistent with the autonomy values underlying free 
speech protections.89 
 
Children’s impaired ability to interpret advertising also calls into question the argument 
that advertising restrictions inhibit their autonomy as receivers. The evidence establishing 
children’s diminished media literacy,90 coupled with research identifying advertising’s role 
as a subliminal consumption cue,91 suggests children may not be truly autonomous when 
acting upon the information presented within food promotions. Advertisers therefore 
manipulate the role of children as receivers in order to preserve their continued interest in 
advertising. Those benefitting from children’s purported right to receive information are 
not receivers themselves, but expressers. In such circumstances, an argument for the 
constitutional protection of commercial expression on the grounds of receivers’ rights to 
receive information is wholly unfounded. 
 
Autonomy-based arguments provide some basis for constitutional protection.92 However, 
the inconsistency of commercial expression with traditional autonomy values raises 
concerns over the appropriate scope of protection afforded. The answer therefore appears 
to lie in a compromise that recognises the possible value of commercial expression to 
  
86 See for example Virginia Board, above n 65, at 763; and RJR-MacDonald, above n 75, at 343. 
87 See Cram, above n 78, at 176. 
88 See Thomas I Emerson “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1963) 72 YLJ 877 at 879. 
89 See Baker, above n 78, at 13. 
90 See Dalmeny, above n 4, at 4; Valkenburg, above n 22, at 52; and Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23, at 
560. 
91 See Harris, Bargh and Brownell, above n 45, at 405-407. 
92 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 237. 
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receivers,93 whilst acknowledging that such expression does not enjoy protections 
commensurate with other forms of expression. 
 
2 The ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
The ‘marketplace of ideas’ concept reflects society’s alleged interest in the free flow of 
commercial information. The concept’s genesis lies in the statement of Holmes J in Abrams 
v United States that “[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market.”94 This argument rests upon the notion that freedom of 
expression protects an open exchange of views that facilitates the search for truth.95 Where 
citizens are able to obtain information relating to decisions that affect their own welfare, it 
is not for government to regulate that information’s dissemination.96 
 
The marketplace concept supports the argument that the best means of ameliorating the 
effects of harmful expression is through facilitating more speech.97 Unlike speech 
restrictions, this ‘counterspeech’ exposes existing mistruths through the process of 
discussion and education.98 Commercial expression is therefore said to merit protection on 
the grounds that its dissemination is conducive to revealing the truth.99 This argument finds 
strong support in economic theory. In particular, a competitive market approach suggests 
that the greater value placed upon truthful expression will result in that information 
‘outcompeting’ misleading and harmful expression.100 Issues persist, however, over the 
extent to which a marketplace of ideas accurately reflects economic theory. 
  
93 See Karla K Gower “Looking Northward: Canada’s Approach to Commercial Expression” (2005) 10 
Comm L & Pol’y 29 at 58. 
94 Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919) at 630 per Holmes J dissenting. 
95 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 232. 
96 See Shiner, above n 62, at 273 and 275. See also United States v Edge Broadcasting Company 509 US 418 
(1993) at 437-438 per Stevens J dissenting. 
97 See Caroline Reid “Freedom of Expression, Commercial Expression and Tobacco in Canada” (2008) 39 
VUWLR 343 at 349. 
98 Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927) at 377 per Brandeis J. 
99 See Shiner, above n 62, at 300. 
100 See RH Coase “Advertising and Free Speech” (1977) 6 JLS 1; and Aaron Director “The Parity of the 
Economic Market Place” (1964) 7 JLE 1. 
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Despite its attractiveness, the marketplace concept exhibits a number of limitations. Firstly, 
the concept overemphasises receivers’ capacity to rationally interpret information.101 In an 
environment characterised by a multiplicity of commercial messages, the reality is that 
consumers’ ability to process information is restricted, particularly when presented with 
incomplete information.102 There are simply too many messages for consumers to process 
rationally. Children’s proven inability to scrutinise marketing communications further 
exemplifies consumers’ diminished rationality when faced with significant quantities of 
advertising for unhealthy foods.103 
 
The application of the marketplace concept to food promotions is also inappropriate given 
the existing disparity between the volume of advertising promoting unhealthy food and that 
promoting healthier dietary alternatives. The marketplace concept posits that desirable 
ideas will eventually outcompete and marginalise harmful information.104 The current 
misalignment of advertising expenditure, however, inhibits the salience of anti-obesity 
messages within the marketplace of ideas. For every dollar spent by the WHO on non-
communicable disease prevention, the food industry spends USD 500 promoting unhealthy 
foods.105 The result is a marketplace in ideas that is not conducive to the equal availability 
of information, and which inhibits the flow of information necessary to convey a well-
rounded image of children’s nutrition. Government regulation is therefore necessary to 
moderate the flow of information encountered by receivers and enable the communication 
of more healthful messages. 
 
The difference in operation between a marketplace in material goods and a marketplace in 
ideas is also pertinent. The greater elusiveness of truth in the context of political expression 
underscores the intolerance towards regulations suppressing expression in the absence of 
an objective truth.106 In the context of commercial expression, the provability of 
  
101 See Shiner, above n 62, at 279. 
102 See Shiner, above n 62, at 279. 
103 See generally Valkenburg, above n 22; and Livingstone and Helsper, above n 23. 
104 See Shiner, above n 62, at 300. 
105 Gorton, above n 5, at 1. 
106 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 235-236. 
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commercial statements arguably justifies a greater role for government regulation.107 Such 
arguments demonstrate that, whilst the ‘marketplace of ideas’ rationale justifies the 
protection of commercial speech, its application also permits much greater regulation than 
is acceptable for other types of expression.108 
 
3 Paternalism 
The approaches discussed in this paper suggest that the regulation of commercial 
expression is generally justified to the extent that such expression is untruthful or 
misleading.109 Greater contention emerges, however, when legislatures seek to regulate on 
the grounds of consumer protection. Whilst such discussion largely assumes that 
commercial speech would otherwise enjoy constitutional protection, it raises important 
issues regarding legislators’ mandate to regulate on the basis that consumers are incapable 
of acting in their own best interest. 
 
The primary basis for anti-paternalist criticism is the argument that individuals must be 
trusted to make legal choices on the basis of the information available to them.110 This 
notion stems from John Stuart Mill’s famous statement that:111 
 
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
 
Consequently, the paternalistic shielding of citizens from information affecting personal 
choice stands to restrict individual autonomy.112 Furthermore, it is suggested that the 
  
107 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 235-236. 
108 See Sharpe, above n 64, at 236. 
109 For example see Virginia Board, above n 65, at 771-773 per Blackmun J. See also Redish, above n 83, at 
634. 
110 See Redish, above n 83, at 618; and Virginia Board, above n 65, at 771-773. 
111 John Stuart Mill “On Liberty” in B Wishy (ed) Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings (University Press 
America, Larsham (MD), 1959) as cited in REG Upshur “Principles for the Justification of Public Health 
Intervention” (2002) 93(2) Canadian Journal of Public Health 101 at 102. See also Redish, above n 83, at 
636. 
112 See Redish, above n 83, at 636. 
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diminished level of protection afforded commercial speech enables the suppression of 
unpopular sentiments under the guise of regulation.113 Although the risk of a heavy-handed 
approach to regulation does exist, the suggestion that regulation could be characterised as 
a manipulation of consumer choice is a strong one.114 
 
Whilst these anti-paternalist arguments have merit, such criticisms ignore the distinction 
between paternalism and consumer protection. Whilst much regulation of commercial 
advertising has a paternalistic component, it also overwhelmingly reflects an attempt to 
quell a wider social harm.115 Where a legitimate state interest exists in reducing social 
harm, the collective benefit in regulation inevitably outweighs questions of individual 
autonomy.116 Similar societal concerns are reflected in the current obesity debate. The 
existing evidence demonstrates obesity’s widespread consequences for individual and 
collective welfare. Given the possible influence of food promotions upon the obesity 
epidemic, the argument in favour of constraining individual rights in support of a wider 
public health objective is compelling. The fact that many democratic constitutions permit 
proportionate and demonstrably justified restrictions upon truthful advertising suggests that 
anti-paternalist concerns must ultimately give way to the wider social interest.117 
 
C Comparative Approaches to the Commercial Expression Doctrine 
1 United States 
In spite of the free speech guarantee contained within the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, the extent of constitutional protection afforded commercial speech has 
varied substantially since its emergence as a distinct category of speech in Valentine v 
Chrestensen.118 Though recognisant of the existence of commercial speech, the initial 
  
113 See Kozinski and Banner, above n 70, at 649-650. 
114 Contrast 44 Liquormart Inc v Rhode Island 517 US 484 (1996) at 526 per Thomas J dissenting. 
115 See Cram, above n 78, at 178. 
116 See Cram, above n 78, at 178. 
117 See Cram, above n 78, at 178.  
118 Valentine v Chrestensen 316 US 52 (1942). 
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position of the United States Supreme Court was that the Constitution imposed no 
restriction upon Congress’s ability to regulate purely commercial advertising.119 
 
Subsequent jurisprudence reveals a substantial softening of this position. In Virginia 
Board, the Court determined that speech that did “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction” was entitled to constitutional protection.120 In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court emphasised the importance of consumers’ interest in the free flow of commercial 
information, an interest that “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [their] interest in 
the day’s most urgent political debate.”121 Though critical of a paternalistic approach to 
regulation,122 the Court remained open to the possibility of commercial speech restrictions. 
In particular, the Court was reluctant to extend free speech protection where speech was 
untruthful or misleading.123 
 
Whilst Virginia Board represented a breakthrough for the commercial expression doctrine, 
it was not until Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New 
York that the doctrine became ‘operationalised’.124 In overturning the Commission’s 
advertising regulations, the Court again recognised the value of commercial expression 
both to the speaker and the audience.125 Although critical of the ‘highly paternalistic’ view 
that the legislature enjoyed unchecked powers of regulation,126 however, the Court 
recognised the lesser protection afforded commercial speech.127 The Court then outlined a 
test against which the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations could be assessed. 
The test can be summarised as follows:128 
 
  
119 At 54. 
120 Virginia Board, above n 65, at 762; citing Pittsburgh Press Co v Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
Relations 413 US 376 (1973) at 385. 
121 At 763. 
122 At 765 and 770. 
123 At 771-773. 
124 Central Hudson, above n 67; see Shiner, above n 62, at 53. 
125 Central Hudson, above n 67, at 561-562. 
126 At 562. 
127 At 563. 
128 At 566. 
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(1) to be protected, commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading; 
(2) the government interest in regulating speech must be substantial; 
(3) the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; and 
(4) the regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest. 
  
This approach reaffirmed the idea that commercial speech merits some protection, albeit at 
a level reflecting its subordinate nature.129 
 
Despite Central Hudson’s operationalisation of the commercial expression doctrine, the 
extent of regulators’ discretion remained unclear. This uncertainty was reflected in Posadas 
de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, in which the Supreme Court 
upheld a total ban on gambling advertising.130 In deferring to the legislature on questions 
of proportionality under the Central Hudson test,131 Posadas demonstrates the potential 
scope enjoyed by regulators to suppress commercial speech.132 This leniency can be 
sharply contrasted with the Court’s subsequent decision in 44 Liquormart Inc v Rhode 
Island.133 Despite the majority’s acceptance of the Central Hudson test, the Court was 
critical of the weak interpretation of the test adopted in Posadas.134 The Court emphasised 
that, notwithstanding the reduced protection enjoyed by commercial speech,135 the 
government must make a real case for regulation.136 Whilst this approach acknowledges 
that the legislature remains the apposite decision-maker in areas of social policy,137 it 
imposes much greater scrutiny upon any resultant regulations. 
 
  
129 See Shiner, above n 62, at 55. 
130 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico 478 US 328 (1986). 
131 Posadas, above n 130, at 344. 
132 See Shiner, above n 62, at 57. 
133 44 Liquormart, above n 114. 
134 At 509-510 per Stevens J. 
135 At 501 per Stevens J. 
136 At 505-506 per Stevens J. 
137 See Cram, above n 78, at 185. 
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The attitude of the United States Supreme Court towards the constitutional protection of 
commercial speech is therefore best viewed as an attempt to reconcile a legislative mandate 
to set economic and social policy with the utility derived from commercial speech. Whilst 
its jurisprudence admits of some protection for commercial expression, the Court’s 
categorical approach affirms that this protection is at a lower level. 
  
2 Canada 
Freedom of expression in Canada is protected through a constitutional guarantee contained 
within s 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.138 Section 1 provides that 
protected expression remains subject only to such limits “as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.”139 R v Oakes established that, provided the regulator’s 
objective is of sufficient importance, limits upon protected rights will be demonstrably 
justified where:140 
 
(1) the measures adopted are designed to achieve the relevant objective; 
(2) the limiting measure impairs the right no more than reasonably necessary; 
and 
(3) the effects of the measures upon the relevant Charter right are 
proportionate to the desired objective. 
  
Despite the Supreme Court’s initial reluctance to protect commercial expression,141 its 
adoption of a “large and liberal interpretation” of the Charter in Ford v Quebec (Attorney 
General) necessitated the extension of free speech protections to commercial expression.142 
Unlike the position in the United States, however, the Supreme Court has refused to 
characterise commercial expression as a distinct category of expression. In Ford, the Court 
explained that the term ‘commercial expression’ did not convey any particular 
  
138 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of Constitution Act) 1982 RS C c-11, s 2(b). 
139 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1. 
140 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at [74]. 
141 See Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 489. 
142 Ford, above n 81, at 767. 
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constitutional meaning.143 Despite this distinction, the practical effect of this approach 
upon the enforcement of the right remains unclear. 
 
The absence of a categorical approach to expression has not precluded Canadian courts’ 
adoption of a lesser standard of protection for commercial expression. In Rocket v Royal 
College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) the Supreme Court held that a “sensitive, case-
oriented approach” towards assessing the constitutionality of regulations under s 1 of the 
Charter permitted consideration of the expression’s commercial nature.144 This analysis 
allowed the Court to give effect to the fact that “not all expression is equally worthy of 
protection.”145 This broad approach was considered necessary, as the variable policy 
considerations in commercial expression cases meant it was inappropriate to adopt a 
standardised test of constitutionality.146 
 
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) was the first case to reaffirm the conclusions 
in Ford in the context of pure commercial expression.147 However, despite establishing that 
the passage of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act 1978148 violated the plaintiff 
advertiser’s freedom of expression,149 Irwin Toy undoubtedly supports greater legislative 
discretion in regulating commercial expression. In applying the Oakes test, the Court 
concluded that a total ban on all advertising directed at children was commensurate with 
the legislature’s “pressing and substantial” goal of limiting the effects of advertising upon 
children.150 The limited scrutiny to which these regulations were subject has led the case 
to be described as a low point for the rights of advertisers.151 
 
  
143 At 755-756. 
144 Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) [1990] 2 SCR 232 at [30]. 
145 At [30], citing Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General) [1989] 2 SCR 1326. 
146 At [33]-[34]. 
147 Irwin Toy, above n 72, at [42]. 
148 Quebec Consumer Protection Act 1978 RS Q c P-40.1. 
149 Irwin Toy, above n 72, at [56]-[57]. 
150 At [88]-[89]. 
151 See Dubick, above n 68, at 107. 
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This is not to suggest that Canadian legislators enjoy an unfettered discretion to regulate. 
In RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General) the Supreme Court found that 
advertising restrictions contained within the Tobacco Products Control Act152 unreasonably 
impinged upon tobacco manufacturers’ freedom of expression.153 Though conscious of 
commercial expression’s reduced protection,154 the Court considered Parliament to have 
provided insufficient justification for its regulations.155 The informational benefits 
conveyed by product advertising underscored the legislature’s inability to excessively 
regulate.156 The Court’s subsequent decision in Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-
MacDonald Corp,157 in which amended tobacco advertising regulations were upheld, 
illustrates that, whilst the legislature remains competent to regulate expression, such 
regulations must be reasonable and demonstrably justified.158 
 
Both Canadian and American jurisprudence confers a limited form of constitutional 
protection upon commercial expression. Given the similarity between the tests in Oakes 
and Central Hudson for assessing the constitutionality of free speech restrictions, the 
Canadian courts’ refusal to adopt a specific category of commercial speech has had little 
practical impact.159 Despite their failure to establish a substantial basis for commercial 
expression, both jurisdictions have ultimately accepted a level of quasi-protection, albeit 
one that admits a degree of deference to potential regulators.160 Regardless, both 
approaches serve as helpful comparators when discussing the treatment of commercial 
expression within New Zealand’s own constitutional setting. 
 
  
152 Tobacco Products Control Act SC 1998 c 20. 
153 RJR-MacDonald, above n 75. 
154 At [175] per McLachlin J. 
155 At [163] per McLachlin J. 
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157 Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-MacDonald Corp [2007] 2 SCR 610. 
158 See Dubick, above n 68, at 130. 
159 See Shiner, above n 62, at 91. 
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3 New Zealand 
Unlike Canada and the United States, the New Zealand judiciary has so far failed to 
establish a substantial jurisprudence in the area of commercial expression. The courts’ 
adoption of a liberal interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, however, suggests 
a more inclusive approach towards commercial expression. In Moonen v Film & Literature 
Board of Review, Tipping J construed ‘expression’ as being “as wide as human thought 
and imagination.”161 This broad definition of expression has resulted in a general 
acceptance that commercial expression is within the scope of constitutional protection 
afforded by s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.162 
 
Despite this protection, New Zealand’s extant jurisprudence suggests support for 
commercial speech restrictions in the context of public health. In a decision relating to the 
proscription of tobacco advertising under the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990,163 the 
District Court in Director-General of Health v Rothmans of Paul Mall (New Zealand) Ltd 
considered the expression of tobacco manufacturers had been justifiably limited under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.164 The Court held that where, as in the Smoke-free 
Environments Act, the legislature has explicitly stated the values upon which the relevant 
limit is based, the harm caused by an advertising ban must be construed narrowly.165 
Despite its conclusions, however, the Court remained conscious of the need to ensure that 
the means used to protect the desired objective were proportionate.166 
 
New Zealand’s existing jurisprudence exhibits a number of similarities to the Canadian 
approach to commercial expression. In adopting a broad definition of expression under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, New Zealand courts have accepted a level of prima facie 
  
161 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) at [15] per Tipping J. 
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constitutional protection for commercial expression. However, the courts’ approach to 
legislative restrictions upon such expression suggests a greater leniency in circumstances 
of pressing public concern. Though the courts’ approach towards assessing the 
constitutionality of legislative restrictions upon free expression will be discussed later in 
this paper,167 the fact remains that New Zealand’s jurisprudence admits a greater capacity 
to regulate commercial expression. Such an approach therefore supports more stringent 
regulation of children’s food and beverage advertising in New Zealand. 
 
D Summary 
An assessment of the theoretical justifications raised in support of the commercial 
expression doctrine reveals a number of inconsistencies between commercial expression 
and the core values underlying free speech protection. These inconsistencies have informed 
subsequent judicial developments in this area. A comparative analysis of the differing 
approaches to commercial expression within free speech jurisprudence illustrates that these 
theoretical considerations have resulted in a lower level of constitutional protection for 
commercial expression. The evidence of a greater willingness to permit regulations 
constraining commercial expression may thereby justify more stringent regulation of 
unhealthy food advertising that targets children. 
 
IV Advertising Regulation in New Zealand 
Food and beverage advertising is repeatedly cited as an important target for anti-obesity 
policies. Despite this, the New Zealand Government has so far refused to contemplate 
statutory intervention.168 Before considering the possibility of reform, an analysis of the 
existing regulatory framework is required to assess its compatibility with a public health 
approach. This analysis highlights the Government’s evident preference for a self-
regulatory framework and the resultant absence of specific legislation concerning food 
advertising. A review of this self-regulatory regime demonstrates that, despite attempts by 
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168 See Ben Heather “Obesity epidemic at ‘crisis’ point” (9 June 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
28 
 
self-regulatory institutions to allay the need for government intervention, there remains 
scope for stronger government regulation of children’s food and beverage advertising. 
 
A Legislative Controls on Advertising 
There is currently no legislative framework that specifically regulates the marketing of 
foods and non-alcoholic beverages in New Zealand. There are, however, a number of 
statutes controlling advertising content generally. Food and beverage manufacturers 
remain subject to general consumer protection legislation, such as the Fair Trading Act 
1986 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. This legislation is largely predicated upon 
protecting consumers in the course of business-to-consumer interaction. Sections 9 and 10 
of the Fair Trading Act proscribe misleading and deceptive conduct in the course of trade. 
Similarly, s 9 of the Consumer Guarantees Act provides that goods supplied to consumers 
must be consistent with the seller’s description of them.  
 
One provision that may be applicable to the promotion of unhealthy foods is s 12A of the 
Fair Trading Act. This section prohibits the making of unsubstantiated representations in 
trade, regardless of whether they are misleading or deceptive.169 As it was only introduced 
in June 2014, the section’s scope remains untested.170 Its focus upon statements made 
without reasonable grounds suggests it could be extended to marketing that irresponsibly 
emphasises healthful product features without due regard to products’ other unhealthy 
characteristics.171 The section does not extend, however, to ‘puffery’ within advertising 
that a consumer would not expect to be substantiated.172 There consequently exists no 
legislation regulating advertising that, whilst not objectively misleading, remains 
emotionally persuasive to vulnerable consumers. 
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This consumer protection legislation is also supplemented by a range of legislation 
regulating the advertising of particular products.173 The most pertinent example of product-
specific advertising regulation is the comprehensive regulatory framework for tobacco 
advertising established by the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. Subject to limited 
statutory authorisation, no person may publish or arrange to have published a tobacco 
product advertisement.174 The Act’s broad interpretation of ‘publish’ requires the ban’s 
application to all media.175 Perhaps informatively for future regulations concerning food 
and beverage advertising, the Act’s stated purposes include the regulation of tobacco 
marketing as a means of reducing social approval for, and use of, harmful tobacco 
products.176 As discussed earlier in this paper, the Act’s specific focus upon reducing the 
harms associated with tobacco use has had important ramifications for the constitutionality 
of its restrictions upon tobacco advertisers’ expression.177  
 
The regulatory context surrounding tobacco advertising differs markedly from that relating 
to food and beverages. Despite this, the regulation of tobacco marketing remains relevant 
when assessing the constitutionality of potential restrictions upon food advertising. This 
paper therefore returns to address the tobacco exemplar when considering the 
constitutionality of a ban on the advertising of unhealthy foods to children under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
 
B Industry Self-Regulation 
1 Advertising codes and scheduling 
Subject to the aforementioned statutory exceptions, the New Zealand advertising industry 
is almost exclusively self-regulating. The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), an 
  
173  See for example Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, pts 2-3; and Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, 
s 237. 
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175 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, s 2(1). 
176 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, ss 3A and 21. 
177 See Part III. 
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organisation comprising representatives of the New Zealand advertising industry,178 
regulates advertising by way of non-statutory Codes of Practice. These codes represent “the 
rules by which all advertisements in all media should comply.”179 Children’s food and 
beverage advertising was traditionally regulated through two separate codes, the Code for 
Advertising of Food and the Code for Advertising to Children.180 Following an extensive 
review of the codes’ suitability to regulating children’s food advertisements,181 in 2010 the 
ASA introduced the Children’s Code for Advertising Food (Children’s Code).182 The 
Children’s Code defines children as anyone under the age of 14, and provides guidelines 
consistent with its requirement that advertisers uphold a high standard of social 
responsibility.183 These guidelines are structured around three core principles:184 
 
Principle 1 – Advertisements should be prepared with and observe a high 
standard of social responsibility to consumers. 
Principle 2 – Advertisements should not mislead or deceive or be likely to 
mislead or deceive children. 
Principle 3 – Persons or characters of appeal to children should not be used to 
promote food in a manner that undermines a healthy diet. 
 
Pursuant to these principles, the Children’s Code provides guidelines relating to nutritional 
claims,185 the manner in which food is presented186 and product endorsements and 
promotions.187 In particular, advertising should not encourage the consumption of food in 
  
178 Advertising Standards Authority “Advertising Standards Authority Inc” <www.asa.co.nz>. 
179 Advertising Standards Authority “The Advertising Standards Authority” <www.asa.co.nz>. 
180 See Advertising Standards Authority “Code for Advertising of Food” <www.asa.co.nz>; and Advertising 
Standards Authority “Code for Advertising to Children” <www.asa.co.nz>. 
181 Advertising Standards Authority Final Report on the Review of the Code for Advertising to Children and 
the Code for Advertising of Food (March 2010). See Sharron Bowers, Louise Signal and Gabrielle Jenkin 
Does Current Industry Self-Regulation of Food Marketing in New Zealand Protect Children from Exposure 
to Unhealthy Food Advertising? (Otago University Health Promotion and Policy Research Unit, 2012) at 6. 
182 See Advertising Standards Authority “Children’s Code for Advertising Food” <www.asa.co.nz>. 
183 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182. 
184 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182. 
185 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182, guidelines 2(c), 2(g), and 2(h). 
186 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182, guidelines 1(a)-1(j). 
187 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182, guidelines 2(e)-2(f). 
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a manner inconsistent with the Ministry of Health’s nutritional guidelines.188 Like many 
self-regulatory regimes, the Children’s Code specifically acknowledges children’s 
vulnerability to marketing communications.189 Despite this, the Code fails to provide 
guidelines restricting the scheduling of advertisements during children’s programming.190 
 
The ASA’s Codes of Practice are further supplemented by specific rules governing 
broadcast advertising on free-to-air (FTA) television. FTA broadcasters have voluntarily 
submitted to scheduling restrictions through the ThinkTV Code.191 The Code proscribes all 
advertisements during pre-school children’s programming, whilst restricting advertising 
during school-age children’s programming to a maximum of 10 minutes per hour.192 The 
Code defines ‘school-age children’ as children between the ages of five and 13.193 Pre-
school children’s programming is generally defined as the period from 6 am – 10 am, with 
an intervening period of school-age children’s programming from 7 am – 8.30 am, during 
which limited advertising is permitted.194 During afternoon slots, pre-school programming 
is defined as being from 2 pm – 3 pm, with school-age programming extending further 
until 5 pm.195 Though evident of an increased appreciation for the need to reduce children’s 
advertising exposure, the narrow scope of these restrictions suggests children are likely to 
remain subject to high levels of exposure during adult programming.  
 
In addition to the ThinkTV Code’s scheduling restrictions, broadcast advertising is also 
subject to screening by the Commercial Approvals Bureau (CAB). The CAB screens all 
advertisements prior to broadcast to ensure consistency with the ASA’s codes.196 Under 
  
188 See Ministry of Health “Food and Nutrition Guidelines to Healthy Children and Young People (Aged 2-
18 years): A Background Paper” (2012) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
189 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 182, guidelines 2(a)-(b). 
190 See generally Advertising Standards Authority, above n 181. 
191 See ThinkTV “Advertising on Television: Getting it Right for Children” (March 2011) 
<www.thinktv.co.nz> at 3. 
192 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 3. 
193 ThinkTV “The Children’s Television Policies: Advertising in Pre-School and School-Age Children’s 
Television Programming Times” (March 2011) <www.thinktv.co.nz>. 
194 ThinkTV, above n 193, at 1. 
195 ThinkTV, above n 193, at 1. 
196 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 3. 
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the ThinkTV Code, the CAB also administers a specific advertising classification for 
children’s food (CF classification). Applicable to all broadcast advertising during school-
age children’s programming, the CF classification assesses the healthfulness of advertised 
foods using both the Ministry of Health’s Food and Beverage Classification System 
(FBCS) and Food Standards Australia New Zealand’s Nutrient Profiling Model (FSANZ 
Model).197 The FBCS categorises food and beverage advertisements according to a 
tripartite classification system. Using a nutrient profiling system, foods are classified as 
either ‘everyday’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘occasional’.198 Both everyday and sometimes foods are 
considered fit for broadcast during school-age children’s programming.199 Occasional 
foods are those that should only be consumed every few months. These foods are therefore 
required to satisfy the stricter requirements of the FSANZ Model before the CAB will 
approve their screening.200 Though this pre-screening process represents a positive 
development, later analysis will demonstrate that the loose nutritional guidelines adopted, 
and the limited range of programming to which they are applied, have limited the regime’s 
effectiveness in serving public health objectives. 
 
2 Compliance and enforcement 
The ASA’s system of enforcement is entirely reactive. Enforcement of the ASA’s codes is 
reliant upon public complaints of an alleged breach to the Advertising Standards 
Complaints Board (ASCB), the administrative body tasked with adjudicating upon 
advertising complaints.201 Any decision of the ASCB is then appealable to the Advertising 
Standards Complaints Appeal Board (ASCAB).202 In the event that a complaint is upheld, 
a request is made of the advertiser to withdraw the advertisement. Despite the absence of 
  
197 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 5. 
198 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 5. 
199 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 5. 
200 ThinkTV, above n 191, at 5. 
201 Advertising Standards Authority “Advertising Standards Complaints Board” <www.asa.co.nz>. 
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any penalties for non-compliance, no advertiser has yet failed to comply with this 
request.203 
 
The ASA’s success in limiting the prevalence of unhealthy children’s advertising through 
the Children’s Code is unclear. Since its implementation, only two complaints have been 
considered by the ASCB, both of which have been denied.204 This limited number of 
complaints paints an uncertain picture of the system’s success. One possibility is that the 
use of detailed guidelines and pre-screening has substantially reduced the number of 
advertisements in breach of the ASA’s Codes of Practice. Alternatively, the absence of 
complaints may be a function of both a lack of consumer knowledge and the perceived 
difficulty in making a complaint to the ASCB.205 The most compelling suggestion is that 
the ambiguity inherent within the ASA’s codes precludes any reduction in children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food and beverage advertising.206 Given the ambiguity and limited 
scope of the current restrictions, undesirable advertising may simply be passing undetected. 
Though the current evidence means this cannot be answered definitively, the possibility of 
such inconsistency between industry self-regulation and reduced volumes of unhealthy 
food advertising begs the question whether a government-led approach informed by public 
health considerations would be more effective in limiting children’s advertising exposure. 
 
C Summary 
The New Zealand Government’s extant refusal to regulate food and beverage advertising 
arises from its stated confidence in the existing self-regulatory framework.207 The industry 
has made concerted attempts to ameliorate the harms posed by unhealthy food advertising 
  
203 Louise Thornley, Louise Signal and George Thomson “Does industry regulation of food advertising 
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discourage unhealthy eating habits among children” (2005) 30 British Nutrition Foundation Nutrition 
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to children. However, the numerous gaps evident within its framework suggest the need 
for a regulatory approach more suited to the achievement of public health objectives. 
Though the deficiencies of the framework will be elaborated upon later in this paper,208 
this discussion has sufficiently highlighted the need to evaluate possible alternatives to the 
self-regulation of food and beverage advertising. 
 
V Comparative Approaches to Advertising Regulation 
As evident from New Zealand’s existing regulatory framework, advertising regulation is 
predominantly seen by legislators as the preserve of the advertising industry itself.209 
Despite this, there remain notable examples of governments’ willingness to intervene in 
the regulation of advertising. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Quebec help demonstrate the alternatives available to legislators. This Part outlines the 
differing regulatory approaches within these jurisdictions and, where possible, attempts to 
comment upon their effectiveness. Though certain issues remain inherent within each 
approach, an understanding of their operation helps inform the development of any future 
advertising restrictions in New Zealand. 
 
A Advertising Regulation in Europe 
1 Broadcasting and the European Directives 
The European Parliament provides extensive guidelines for commercial advertising 
regulation within the European Union. In addition to prescribing general consumer 
protection laws,210 these guidelines also provide specifically for broadcasting regulations. 
The Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF Directive) prescribes minimum 
  
208 See Part VI. 
209 See Hawkes, above n 10, at 1964. 
210 See Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 
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and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2005] OJ L 149/22 
(‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’). 
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standards for broadcasting that must be incorporated within the domestic legislation of all 
Member States.211 Specifically, it seeks to regulate advertising that encourages “behaviour 
prejudicial to health and safety”,212 and that which causes “moral or physical detriment to 
minors.”213 As these are only minimum standards, Member States remain free to impose 
stricter rules upon broadcasters subject to their jurisdiction.214 
 
The terms of the TVWF Directive are supplemented by the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (AVMS Directive).215 Article 9, which governs children’s food advertising, 
specifically prescribes the development of regulations moderating advertising’s effects 
upon children.216 The AVMS Directive’s effectiveness, however, is constrained by its 
failure to include a commonly held definition of both ‘children’ and ‘unhealthy’ foods.217 
Its provisions are therefore susceptible to vastly differing interpretations within domestic 
legislation.218 
 
The primary deficiency of both broadcasting directives lies in their inability to effectively 
regulate the cross-border transmission of broadcast advertising. Both directives operate on 
the basis of the ‘state of establishment’ principle, which holds that broadcasters need only 
abide by the legislation of the Member State from which they are transmitted.219 States’ 
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obligations to respect this principle have since been confirmed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, which established that states’ domestic advertising restrictions are 
inapplicable to extra-territorial broadcasts.220 These restrictions have therefore limited the 
ability of European states to independently regulate against the harmful effects of unhealthy 
food advertising within their respective territories.221 
 
2 United Kingdom 
Advertising regulation within the United Kingdom is governed by a co-regulatory 
framework involving both statutory and industry bodies. The predominant institution is the 
United Kingdom Office of Communications (Ofcom). Under the Communications Act 
2003, Ofcom is mandated to set and review national broadcasting standards.222 These 
standards are based on a set of regulatory objectives, which include the object of protecting 
persons under the age of 18.223  In pursuance of these objectives, the Communications Act 
authorises Ofcom to draft standards relating to both the timing and content of 
advertisements.224  
 
The existing co-regulatory framework arose specifically from governmental concerns 
regarding “the nature and balance of food and beverage advertising.”225 As the body 
responsible for the publication of advertising standards, Ofcom was engaged to strengthen 
the existing rules on the advertising of food and drink products to children.226 Following 
an extensive consultation process, the following measures were adopted:227 
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(a) A ban on high fat, sugar and salt (HFSS) product advertisements in or around 
programmes made for children (including pre-school children); 
(b) a ban on HFSS advertisements in or around programmes likely to be of 
particular appeal to children aged four to 15; and 
(c) a ban on sponsorship in the name of HFSS products in programmes of 
particular appeal to children. 
 
The review also led to revised content rules applicable to all advertising irrespective of 
scheduling times. These rules relate primarily to the use of marketing techniques likely to 
appeal to children. In particular, the revised rules speak to the use of popular figures, 
promotional offers and marketing techniques appealing to parent pressure.228  
 
These revised regulations have required the adoption of universal definitions for both 
‘unhealthy foods’ and ‘children’s programming’. Food and drink products are assessed as 
HFSS using the United Kingdom Food Safety Authority’s nutrient profiling scheme, which 
screens products with a high level of undesirable nutrient content.229 Children’s 
programming is defined using a combination of dedicated children’s channels and 
children’s television slots on the main public service broadcasting channels (PSB 
channels).230 Although these slots vary with each channel, they focus predominantly upon 
the period from 6 am – 11 am.231 Only one channel has afternoon programming considered 
as a children’s slot,232 with all other programming considered adult airtime.233 
 
Under the co-regulatory framework, Ofcom has contracted out its regulatory function with 
regard to broadcast advertising.234 In accordance with this arrangement, the advertising 
industry’s code-making body, the Broadcast Committee for Advertising Practice (BCAP) 
  
228 United Kingdom Office of Communications, above n 227, at 48-53. 
229 See United Kingdom Food Standards Authority Nutrient Profiling Technical Guidance (April 2009); and 
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is responsible for the implementation of the revised standards within the United Kingdom 
Code of Broadcast Advertising.235 Another industry body, the United Kingdom 
Advertising Standards Authority (UKASA), is responsible for the monitoring and 
enforcement of advertisers’ compliance with the Code.236 Notwithstanding this delegated 
responsibility, the functions of both the UKASA and BCAP are exercised subject to 
Ofcom’s agreement.237 
 
Despite being the first country to introduce statutory scheduling rules targeting children’s 
food advertisements,238 the United Kingdom’s co-regulatory framework has enjoyed a 
mixed reception. In its review of the system in 2010, Ofcom suggested that its scheduling 
restrictions had reduced children’s exposure to HFSS advertisements by 37 per cent.239 The 
accuracy of these figures has been contested, however, with multiple studies citing an 
increase in the level of children’s exposure subsequent to the ban’s implementation.240  
 
The primary criticism levelled at the scheme concerns its limited scope. Though Ofcom’s 
restrictions have enjoyed relative success with broadcast advertising, the effectiveness of 
the ban has been limited across other media. Evidence suggests that, despite the scheme’s 
effect in reducing advertisers’ outlay upon food advertising within children’s television, 
advertising expenditure across all media rose during the same period.241 Furthermore, the 
restriction’s limited focus upon children’s programming inhibits its effectiveness in 
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reducing children’s exposure during adult airtime.242 When coupled with the TVWF 
Directive’s effect in proscribing the restriction of extra-territorial broadcasts, the width of 
the United Kingdom’s regulations becomes considerably narrowed. This suggests a more 
comprehensive approach to scheduling and media coverage is necessary to effectively 
reduce children’s exposure to HFSS advertising. 
 
3 Sweden 
Unlike the United Kingdom, Sweden’s regulatory framework for children’s advertising did 
not arise specifically out of concerns regarding food-related marketing. Instead, Swedish 
initiatives to restrict advertising to children have stemmed from children’s accepted 
vulnerability to marketing communications.243 Swedish society places considerable 
emphasis upon the need to support weaker citizens in their capacity as consumers.244 
Consumer protection within Sweden is therefore viewed as an important responsibility of 
the state.245  
 
The Swedish Marketing Practices Act governs all advertising in Sweden, regardless of its 
target audience or the media used.246 The Act focuses upon encouraging good marketing 
practice,247 pursuant to which it requires that marketing be trustworthy and not 
misleading.248 In addition to establishing a framework of general rules for marketers, the 
Act provides a set of specific rules relating to certain marketing activities.249  
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The general provisions of the Marketing Practices Act are supplemented by specific 
regulations governing children’s television advertising. The Swedish Radio and Television 
Law prohibits all television advertising during programmes directed at children under 
12.250 Whether a particular commercial is directed at children involves consideration of the 
characteristics of the product, the commercial’s design and the time at which it is 
broadcast.251 The ban is rigorously enforced, with the Consumer Ombudsman holding 
significant powers to ensure advertisers’ compliance.252 Regulatory enforcement also 
benefits from the prevailing attitude to consumer protection within Swedish society, with 
almost 90 per cent of Swedish advertising professionals supporting a ban on children’s 
advertising.253 
 
Regardless of this success, the Swedish regulatory framework exhibits a number of 
deficiencies. The Radio and Television Law’s vague definition of the phrase “directed at 
children” has created issues for advertisers, particularly where advertising is designed to 
appeal to both adults and children.254 Though advertisers are generally in support of the 
ban, its inherent uncertainties exert a potential chilling effect upon some advertising. 
Attempts by enforcement authorities to overcome this problem by adopting a less 
restrictive approach have resulted in a number of potentially harmful advertisements falling 
outside the scope of the ban.255  Like the United Kingdom, Swedish regulations also suffer 
from an absence of specific provisions relating to children’s internet advertising.256 Whilst 
internet advertising remains subject to the general provisions of the Marketing Practices 
Act, the growth in internet-based marketing suggests a more comprehensive approach is 
required. 
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The primary constraint upon Swedish regulations’ effectiveness in reducing children’s 
advertising exposure has been the prevalence of cross-border broadcasting. Sweden, like 
the United Kingdom, remains subject to the TVWF Directive’s ‘state of establishment’ 
principle. Given the majority of European states remain willing to abide by the minimum 
standards prescribed by the Directive, the effectiveness of the Swedish ban stands to be 
undermined by commercials carried on extra-territorial television broadcasts.257 This is 
reinforced by the fact that only one of the three channels most popular with Swedish 
children is broadcast from within Sweden.258 The absence of an integrated, trans-national 
approach to broadcast regulation therefore sheds doubt on the potential success of further 
independently implemented broadcast regulations.259 
 
B Quebec 
Unlike other Canadian provinces, in which advertising is exclusively self-regulated,260 the 
Quebecois legislature has specifically legislated for children’s advertising protections. 
Section 248 of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act 1978 prohibits commercial 
advertising directed at children under the age of 13.261 Section 249 provides that, in 
determining whether an advertisement is targeted at children, account must be taken of the 
advertisement’s context, including the nature of the goods advertised, the manner in which 
it is presented and the time and place of presentation.262 The Quebec Office de la Protection 
du Consommateur also promulgates additional guidelines to facilitate marketers’ 
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compliance,263 whilst proposed advertisements are subject to proactive review by Quebec’s 
Consumer Ombudsman prior to broadcast.264 In the context of television advertising, 
programming for which children’s viewership is greater than 15 per cent is considered 
children’s programming.265 Because the legislation requires consideration of both the 
timing and character of the advertising, however, food and beverage advertisements 
appealing to children younger than 13 remain permitted during adult programming.266 
 
The strength of the Quebecois ban lies in its applicability to a broad range of advertising 
media. The Consumer Protection Act defines the words ‘to advertise’ as meaning “to 
prepare, utilise, distribute, publish or broadcast an advertisement, or to cause it to be 
distributed, published or broadcast.”267 Unlike the other approaches discussed, this 
definition enables the ban to extend to a range of media. Given the increasing fragmentation 
of marketing communications,268 this suggests the Quebecois ban could be more effective 
in reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. 
 
The period of time since the ban’s implementation has also afforded opportunities to 
measure its effect, not only upon advertising exposure, but also upon food consumption 
behaviours. Studies reveal that the ban has resulted in French-speaking children in Quebec 
being exposed to a significantly lower percentage of HFSS advertising when compared 
with English-speaking children in Quebec and Ontario.269 The consequences of reduced 
exposure upon consumption are also marked. A cross-sectional study has suggested young 
adults in French-speaking Quebecois households with children are 38 per cent less likely 
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to purchase fast food in a given week than in Ontario.270 When extrapolated to all French-
speaking households in Quebec, this suggests that the ban results in 16.8 million fewer fast 
food meals being sold per year.271 
 
The ban has also led to substantial changes in marketing practice. Its primary effect has 
been to limit advertising expenditure within media covered by the ban. Sources estimate 
the net loss to Quebec’s advertising market from this to be between USD 3.9 million and 
USD 8.2 million.272 There have also been marked changes in commercial content, with 
commercials intentionally designed to appear less appealing to children.273 If the ban’s 
rationale is to ameliorate the effect of advertisements upon children, this re-orientation of 
marketing efforts towards adults better suited to understanding advertising’s intent 
represents a resounding success.  
 
Notwithstanding this success, Quebec’s advertising ban still admits scope for 
improvement. Its differing effects upon children again demonstrate the issue posed by 
cross-border transmissions. Canadian federal law prohibits the application of the 
Quebecois ban to any advertisement broadcast or propagated from outside Quebec.274 
Furthermore, pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the moderation by 
Canadian authorities of cable signals rebroadcast from the United States is prohibited.275 
The cross-border transmission of unhealthy food advertising, in conjunction with the 
inherent gaps within its application, therefore minimises the Quebecois ban’s effectiveness. 
It is consequently suggested that as much as 30 per cent of food advertisements featured in 
Quebec remain targeted at children.276 This percentage is much greater for English-
speaking Quebecois children, who are subjected to cross-border transmissions containing 
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advertisements produced in the English language.277 These limits upon the ban’s 
effectiveness are therefore pertinent when considering the likely success of a similar 
advertising ban within New Zealand. 
 
VI The Constitutionality of an Advertising Ban for New Zealand 
A A Possible Advertising Ban for New Zealand 
The existing evidence provides sufficient justification to consider the potential for a ban on 
unhealthy food advertising targeting children. The nature of the ban chosen, however, has 
substantial repercussions for both its efficacy and its consistency with New Zealand’s 
existing free speech protections. The differing international approaches to advertising 
regulation provide important lessons in this respect. The limited application of advertising 
restrictions to non-broadcast media in both Sweden and the United Kingdom patently 
undermines the regulations’ effectiveness in reducing children’s advertising exposure. This 
conclusion suggests a broad regulatory framework is needed to counter the likely 
substitution effects of a limited advertising ban upon advertising expenditure in new 
media.278 An approach analogous with the Quebecois ban is therefore suggested given its 
applicability to a range of media. The appropriateness of this suggestion is reinforced by 
the constitutional similarities between Canada and New Zealand. Furthermore, the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s prior validation of the Quebecois ban as a justified limitation 
upon free expression should prove informative when considering the constitutionality of a 
similar ban in New Zealand.279 
 
This paper does not, however, suggest a wholesale transplantation of the Quebecois 
approach. Given the potential cultural disparities between countries, regulations should not 
  
277 See Kent, Dubois and Wanless, above n 266, at 1836; and Dhar and Baylis, above n 270, at 811. 
278 See Maria Morgan and others “A content analysis of children’s television advertising: focus on food and 
oral health” (2008) 12(6) Public Health Nutrition 748 at 754; and Henry Saffer and Frank Chaloupka “The 
effect of tobacco advertising bans on tobacco consumption” (2000) 19 Journal of Health Economics 1117 at 
1122-1124. 
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be imported haphazardly.280 A more tailored approach to the regulation of children’s food 
and beverage advertising than that used in Quebec is therefore required. A ban focused 
upon children under the age of 13 is consistent with both scientific and industry 
understandings of children’s vulnerability.281 Though international guidelines advocate the 
regulation of all commercial promotions,282 any approach should be tailored more 
specifically to obesity-related concerns. This paper therefore suggests a ban prohibiting all 
advertising of unhealthy food and beverages directed at children under the age of 13 years. 
This narrower approach would minimise the restrictions imposed upon freedom of 
expression. The suggested ban focuses only upon advertisements promoting unhealthy 
foods and beverages. The use of the stricter FSANZ nutrient profiling guidelines should be 
retained,283 with all advertising either aimed at children or broadcast during children’s 
programming to be consistent with its nutritional standards. When attempting to establish 
whether advertising is targeted at children, the advice provided within s 249 of the Quebec 
Consumer Protection Act and its supplementary guidelines is informative.284 However, 
given the existing Quebecois regime’s failure to regulate children’s advertising during 
adult programming, the suggested ban would extend to all advertising designed to appeal 
to children, regardless of the time shown.  
 
Having developed the structure for a potential ban, its consistency with the existing 
constitutional protections for free expression can now be considered. Given the broad 
definition of expression adopted for the purposes of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,285 
commercial expression is considered within the purview of constitutional protection.286 
The restriction of advertising as a form of expression therefore limits the right to free 
  
280 See Susy Frankel "New Zealand: Regulation of Tobacco, Alcohol and Unhealthy Food in New Zealand 
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expression under s 14.287 The Canadian Supreme Court in Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec 
(Attorney General) has previously considered that the Quebecois advertising ban 
represents a demonstrably justified limit upon free expression.288 Despite the identical 
constitutional framework informing this analysis, the Court’s conclusions are not directly 
applicable to the tailored version of the Quebecois ban suggested here. Given 25 years have 
passed since the decision in Irwin Toy, the changing commercial and media environment 
suggests a re-evaluation of the ban’s constitutionality is appropriate. Moreover, as the 
Quebecois ban was not informed specifically by public health concerns, a constitutional 
analysis informed by such considerations is merited.  This paper accordingly considers 
whether the context provided by the burgeoning obesity epidemic enables the ban’s 
justification under s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
 
B Is an Advertising Ban a Demonstrably Justified Limit upon Freedom of Expression? 
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute. Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 provides that “the rights and freedoms contained in this Act may be subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.” The New Zealand Supreme Court in R v Hansen, adopting the 
Canadian approach established in R v Oakes,289 have structured this analysis under the 
following headings:290 
 
(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(b) (i)  is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii)  does the limiting measure impair the right … no more than is reasonably 
necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii)  is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
 
  
287 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
288 Irwin Toy, above n 72, at [88]-[89]. 
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1 Prescribed by law? 
Limitations prescribed by law are required to be “identifiable and expressed with sufficient 
precision in an Act of Parliament. Limits must be neither ad hoc nor arbitrary and their 
nature and consequences must be clear.”291 Here, the suggested ban confers a discretion 
upon the adjudicator to consider whether an advertisement targets children. International 
exemplars have previously revealed the difficulty faced by advertisers in defining 
‘children’ for the purposes of their compliance with statutory prohibitions.292 In applying 
this discretion under the proposed legislation, however, the decision maker is provided with 
clear guidelines. The provision of additional guidance moulded upon s 249 of the Quebec 
Consumer Protection Act and its associated guidelines ameliorates any discretionary 
uncertainty.293 Such guidance will thereby enable advertisers to proactively ascertain 
advertisements’ consistency with the legislation. 
 
The proposed regulations also provide clear rules regarding the types of food advertising 
proscribed. The use of the FSANZ nutrient profiling model is consistent with a public 
health understanding of healthful nutrition. Moreover, advertisers’ argument that the 
FSANZ model introduces an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the legislation is 
negated, given its use within the existing voluntary restrictions adopted by FTA 
broadcasters under the ThinkTV Code. In Irwin Toy, the Canadian Supreme Court 
considered that the conferral of a discretion in applying the law was legitimate in so far as 
“the legislature has provided an intelligible standard according to which the [decision 
maker] must do its work.”294 Given the current standards are modelled upon those 
considered by the Court in Irwin Toy, the terms of the proposed ban are sufficiently 
intelligible to be considered prescribed by law. 
 
  
291 R v Hansen, above n 290, at [180] per McGrath J. 
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2 Does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment 
of the right or freedom? 
When considering the importance of the legislator’s objective, the relevant object is that of 
the infringing measure itself.295 To merit justification this objective “must relate to 
concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.”296 The way in 
which this objective is framed therefore impacts the limit’s subsequent justification. 
Despite focusing predominantly upon the objective of the limit, Butler and Butler suggest 
that the objective of the law as a whole remains relevant to determining the limit’s own 
importance.297 Though the legislator’s objective must be sufficiently pressing, the 
threshold of importance is considered low.298 The courts will typically be hesitant to 
impugn a purpose considered important by Parliament, particularly on issues of social 
policy.299 
 
The main purpose of a ban on the advertising of unhealthy foods to children is to reduce 
the harm caused by children’s exposure to unhealthy food and beverage advertising. 
Evidence of this objective’s importance is prevalent throughout the international regulatory 
environment. From a public health perspective, the WHO has consistently reiterated its 
view that the marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages to children constitutes an 
international issue.300 Its publication of principles guiding the regulation of food and 
beverage advertising is consistent with the view that responsibility for the obesity epidemic 
lies at a governmental level.301 
 
Children’s vulnerability to advertising is also well established. Empirical evidence reveals 
substantial deficiencies in children’s media literacy that result in an inability to accurately 
  
295 RJR-MacDonald, above n 75, at [144] per McLachlin J. 
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interpret advertising’s intent.302 This vulnerability is also reflected within international 
human rights instruments. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
specifically condones regulations that limit rights in order to protect children’s interests.303 
Government intervention on public health grounds is therefore necessary where individuals 
are incapable of producing desired outcomes themselves.304 In Irwin Toy, the Canadian 
Supreme Court considered the general vulnerability of children to advertising generated a 
“consensus of concern”.305 The restriction of children’s television marketing was 
consequently seen as a sufficiently important objective.306 Though this decision was not 
concerned with the wider issue of children’s obesity, the issue’s growing prevalence and 
its resultant social costs further reinforce the importance of the ban’s objective in limiting 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food and beverage advertisements.  
 
3 Is the limiting measure rationally connected to its purpose? 
The rational connection analysis involves establishing a causal connection between the 
limit and its intended purpose.307 The limit must therefore be “fair and not arbitrary [and] 
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question”.308 A ban on the advertising of 
unhealthy foods and beverages to children is clearly connected to legislators’ object of 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. The effect of the ban is to 
proscribe the advertising of unhealthy foods to children. Children’s exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising is thus likely to be reduced as a result. Rather than being seen as an 
arbitrary limit, the contemplated ban represents a logical attempt to ameliorate food 
marketing’s effects upon children. 
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Conversely, though a rational connection exists between an advertising ban and its 
objective in reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, there remain issues 
of causality with the law’s wider objective of reducing children’s obesity. As discussed 
earlier in this paper,309 the evidential link between food marketing and obesity is tenuous. 
This concern is therefore further developed when considering whether the benefits of a ban 
on the advertising of unhealthy foods and beverages to children are proportionate with its 
effects upon free expression. 
 
4 Does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably 
necessary for the achievement of its purpose? 
The minimal impairment analysis requires the approach taken to fall “within a range of 
reasonable alternatives.”310 In R v Hansen, McGrath J considered the question to be 
“whether there was an alternative but less intrusive means of addressing the legislature’s 
objective which would have a similar level of effectiveness.”311 In the context of a public 
health approach to addressing children’s food and beverage marketing, Roberto suggests 
three possible alternatives: industry self-regulation, government policies mandating 
reduced children’s marketing and counter-advertising strategies to educate and defend 
children from unhealthy food marketing.312 The question therefore becomes whether the 
suggested alternatives represent reasonable alternatives capable of ameliorating 
advertising’s harmful effects with a similar level of effectiveness. 
 
New Zealand’s existing system illustrates why self-regulation cannot be considered a 
reasonable alternative to government-imposed advertising restrictions. An absence of 
quantitative evidence means the effectiveness of self-regulation in New Zealand cannot be 
objectively assessed.313 The difficulty in comparing approaches is exacerbated by the fact 
  
309 See Part II. 
310 Child Poverty Action Group Inc v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 402, [2013] 3 NZLR 729 at [102]. 
311 R v Hansen, above n 290, at [217] per McGrath J. 
312 Christina A Roberto “Counter-advertising to combat unhealthy food marketing will not be enough 
commentary on ‘Can counter-advertising reduce pre-adolescent children’s susceptibility to front-of-package 
promotions on unhealthy foods? Experimental Research’” (2014) 116 Social Science & Medicine 220 at 220. 
313 See Gorton, above n 5, at 5. 
51 
 
that no other system has yet been tried. Nonetheless, a number of the system’s features 
invite comment. In particular, the system’s scope provides ample opportunities for 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food and beverage advertising. The ASA’s existing codes 
do not contain scheduling restrictions for advertisements targeting children or which are 
broadcast during children’s programming. Moreover, the scheduling restrictions in place 
for FTA broadcasters under the ThinkTV Code are arbitrary and narrow in their 
application. Restrictions are applied during a narrow band of morning and afternoon 
programming ending no later than 5 pm.314 This overlooks the fact that children form a 
substantial proportion of television viewership during adult airtime. Research in 2008 
suggested that the median bedtime for children aged 6–8 was 7.30 pm.315 These numbers 
were even greater for older children, with children aged 9–11 exhibiting a median bedtime 
of 8.30 pm or later.316 This suggests that children are likely to remain exposed to significant 
quantities of unhealthy food advertising during adults’ programming.  
 
Advertising broadcast during school-age children’s programming is also subject to 
nutritional pre-screening. However, the nutritional guidelines applied to advertising remain 
sufficiently ambiguous to limit their effectiveness in reducing the volume of unhealthy 
food advertisements.317 The absence of external input regarding the application of these 
health guidelines has resulted in an approach that is ill informed by public health 
considerations. These problems are compounded by the fact that scheduling restrictions 
and the associated pre-screening of children’s food advertisements are only applied across 
two FTA television channels.318 The high viewership of subscription broadcasting within 
New Zealand therefore indicates the limited impact that these voluntary restrictions are 
likely to have upon children’s exposure levels.319 
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The system’s deficiencies are further reinforced by inherent issues in its monitoring and 
enforcement. The ASA’s current complaints system is considered highly reactive, given its 
reliance upon public complaint before action is taken to remove an advertisement.320 The 
time taken to consider a complaint also results in an advertisement’s effects being felt for 
a considerable period before its withdrawal.321 With no penalties for non-compliance, this 
reactive approach thereby facilitates a permissive advertising environment in which 
advertisers are repeatedly encouraged to test the system’s limits.322 
 
The inadequacies of the existing self-regulatory framework also speak to the wider 
incompatibility of self-regulation with the achievement of public health objectives. 
Industry groups face limited incentives to regulate advertising according to a public health 
approach. These misaligned incentives result in a misplaced focus upon advertising’s 
content and not its effects.323 Hawkes describes this phenomenon as “enlightened self-
interest,”324 whereby self-regulation purports to control misleading or offensive marketing 
in order to justify its continued existence.325 This approach ignores the fact that the 
cumulative effects of advertising are more impactful than individually misleading 
advertisements.326 The mere presence of unhealthy children’s advertising may pose a threat 
to children’s health. The profit motives of advertisers and food manufacturers underscore 
the fundamental inconsistency between self-regulation and public health objectives. 
Market competition requires advertisers to continually stretch boundaries in attempts to 
stimulate demand for their products.327 Advertisers consequently face diminished 
incentives to regulate advertising without the threat of government regulation.328 If industry 
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self-regulation is viewed as a means of avoiding external intervention,329 the New Zealand 
Government’s continued refusal to regulate food and beverage advertising has wholly 
deprived advertisers of the incentive to self-regulate effectively.  
 
These limitations suggest a number of reasons why a self-regulatory approach to 
advertising is ill suited to the achievement of public health objectives. To the extent that 
self-regulation has remained the preferred option for legislators, this suggests its existence 
is founded more upon economic and legal considerations than reasons of social policy.330 
Industry representatives continually stress that self-regulation’s effectiveness in limiting 
the harms caused by unhealthy food and beverage advertising is evident from critics’ 
inability to objectively prove otherwise. However, the conceptual incompatibility of a self-
regulatory approach with the object of reducing children’s advertising exposure 
demonstrates that self-regulation is not a reasonable alternative to government restrictions 
upon unhealthy food advertising. 
 
The food and advertising industries have also suggested the use of counter-advertising as 
an alternative to government-enforced restrictions. This counter-advertising can take a 
number of forms, with product labelling and proactive social marketing suggested as two 
means of educating children with regard to advertising and nutrition. Some commentators 
have suggested that such strategies are more successful in reducing advertising’s impact 
than attempts to control advertising itself.331 Notwithstanding its supporters, however, there 
remain numerous issues with a counter-advertising approach.  
 
The success of counter-advertising initiatives is heavily dependent upon children’s 
comprehension. Though evidence suggests healthful marketing communications have 
positive effects upon children’s nutritional behaviours,332 these effects are moderated by 
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children’s media literacy.333 Where children are incapable of interpreting anti-obesity 
messages, messages’ effects upon consumption are markedly negative.334 Given the 
accepted limitations upon children’s media literacy, this evidence supports the imposition 
of statutory advertising restrictions in lieu of social marketing efforts. Similar limitations 
exist in relation to product labelling. Whilst nutritional labelling is suggested to inform 
healthier consumer choices, this overstates consumers’ ability to utilise this information. 
Market research demonstrates that Māori, Pacific Islanders and lower socioeconomic 
groups rarely utilise nutritional product labelling.335 Given obesity is disproportionately 
reflected within these demographics,336 a counter-advertising approach is likely to be 
discriminatory and inconsistent in its effects. The differing cultural perspectives of Māori 
and Pacific Island groups also explain the unique nature of the New Zealand regulatory 
environment. Whilst an exposition of the cultural factors underlying regulation is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the communal approach of Māori and Pacific cultures to social 
issues suggests government-led regulation is necessary to collectively manage obesity 
concerns. 
 
These conclusions are confirmed by the fact that counter-advertising has proven only to be 
effective above a threshold level.337 Given the vast disparity in expenditure upon social 
marketing initiatives and unhealthy product advertising, the success of social-marketing 
measures is likely to be limited.338 To increase children’s exposure to more healthful 
messages would therefore require an uncongenial level of government expenditure. 
Conversely, existing research illustrates that advertising restrictions represent the most 
cost-effective means of reducing the harms caused by children’s exposure to unhealthy 
food advertisements.339 Logic also suggests that an upstream approach targeting the obesity 
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environment is more appropriate than palliative measures to reduce advertising’s effects at 
an individual level.  
 
The costs and limited effectiveness of a counter-advertising approach demonstrate that it 
is not a reasonable alternative to an outright ban on the advertising of unhealthy food to 
children. Given the issues with both self-regulation and counter-advertising, the 
recommended ban should therefore be seen as the minimally impairing alternative 
necessary to successfully reduce the effects of children’s exposure to unhealthy food and 
beverage advertising. 
 
5 Is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
In assessing the proportionality of the limit, “the balance to be struck is between social 
advantage and harm to the right.”340 The key question is therefore whether the benefits 
conferred by the limit outweigh its deleterious effects.341 The Court of Appeal in Minister 
of Health v Atkinson considered that this analysis involves affording a degree of latitude to 
Parliament, particularly in areas of social and economic policy.342 This is suggested to 
create a spectrum ranging from matters involving “major political, social or economic 
decisions … to matters which have a substantial legal content”.343 When considering the 
current context it is therefore appropriate to allow Parliament some leeway to regulate in 
the face of evidential uncertainty. Notwithstanding this, there remain a number of concerns 
relating to whether, in spite of the discretion afforded Parliament, a statutory ban on the 
advertising of unhealthy foods to children represents a proportional limit upon free 
expression. 
 
This paper has previously suggested that the tenuous connection between food marketing 
and obesity brings into question the efficacy of measures attempting to limit children’s 
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exposure to unhealthy food advertising.344 Though a rational connection exists between the 
suggested ban and its stated object of reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food and 
beverage advertisements, the potential futility of the law’s wider objective suggests the 
ban’s effect upon freedom of expression is disproportionate. In this respect, opponents of 
a ban may highlight the Canadian Supreme Court’s previous rejection of advertising 
restrictions on the grounds of evidential uncertainty. In RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada 
(Attorney General), the Court considered that the absence of a direct link between tobacco 
consumption and the advertising of tobacco in certain contexts precluded the imposition of 
a wholesale ban on tobacco advertising.345 Though similar evidential uncertainty exists in 
the context of food and beverage advertising, the ability to analogise with tobacco 
regulations is limited. Firstly, the decision in RJR-MacDonald appears predominantly 
motivated by the Canadian legislature’s arbitrariness and its failure to present evidence in 
support of the suggested ban.346 Moreover, the imposition of a similar ban on tobacco 
advertising in New Zealand has been upheld as being proportionate with its stated objective 
of reducing the harms associated with tobacco marketing.347  
 
The nature of the obesity epidemic is also sufficiently unique to reject an analogy with 
tobacco advertising for the purposes of defining the evidence necessary to justify 
regulation. Unlike tobacco consumption, which is an easily measured behaviour, the 
prevalence of obesity is mediated by a complex network of factors.348 Consequently, the 
lack of a direct link between food promotions and obesity should not be considered fatal to 
the case for government regulation. Rather than demonstrating the ineffectiveness of 
marketing restrictions, the absence of a direct link to obesity underscores the importance 
of an integrated approach to obesity-related policy. As previously outlined, a degree of 
legislative leeway is appropriate in circumstances where the decision-maker is forced to 
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engage with a range of complex social and economic considerations.349 In such cases, 
decisions must inevitably be reached on the basis of evidential uncertainty.350 It is the 
legislature’s accountability to its constituency that vindicates this broader discretion.351 
This argument is consistent with a precautionary approach to public health policy.352 The 
exigencies of public health policy should enable legislators to curtail individual interests in 
pursuit of a broader social object. In circumstances where the legislature is forced to rely 
upon uncertain evidence in regulating to contain the threat of a public health epidemic, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act should not be used to chill the development of policy 
consistent with the public interest. 
 
Opponents of the ban are also likely to consider its effectiveness across and within media 
as illustrative of its limited practical benefits. Prospective advertising restrictions have 
sparked criticism due their perceived futility. Commentators suggest that marketers’ efforts 
will simply become redirected towards non-traditional media beyond the scope of 
regulation.353 Existing figures already evidence a reorientation of marketing efforts towards 
non-traditional elements of the promotions mix, such as sponsorship and in-store 
promotions.354 Though the suggested ban applies to a range of media, its coverage is not 
exhaustive. There consequently remain opportunities for marketers to exploit these gaps 
and to expose children to unhealthy product advertising. International examples of statutory 
advertising restrictions also illustrate that extra-territorial broadcasting may significantly 
undermine restrictions’ efficacy.355 However, this is not a problem for regulations in New 
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Zealand. Given the geographical distance separating New Zealand from other territories, 
all programming must be rebroadcast domestically.356 As a result, broadcasting regulations 
may be applied to all programming without being undermined by extra-territorial 
transmissions. This therefore negates one of the key flaws exhibited by other international 
regulatory frameworks.  This advantage may be nullified, however, by New Zealand’s 
continued attempts to develop trade relations with other countries and the resultant 
concessions likely to be made regarding advertising and intellectual property laws. In 
particular, though the on-going negotiations surrounding the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement remain secret, the agreement is expected to contain provisions restricting New 
Zealand’s ability to regulate the advertising of certain products.357 These concessions may 
thus impair the efficacy of a potential advertising ban in a manner that renders its effect 
upon freedom of expression disproportionate to the benefits it confers. 
 
Though concerns exist over the potentially limited benefits of the suggested ban, these are 
mitigated by the ban’s limited effect upon the right to freedom of expression. The proposed 
ban is tailored specifically to the harm caused by children’s vulnerability to food and 
beverage advertising. This is reflected in a focus upon advertisements for unhealthy foods 
and beverages either targeted at children or broadcast during children’s programming.  
Some adults may be incidentally prevented from viewing advertisements in circumstances 
where children’s advertising is broadcast during adult airtime. However, these effects are 
ancillary to the ban’s true focus upon children’s advertising. The ban generally respects 
adults’ freedom of expression and their right to make choices on the basis of the 
information available to them. Though Parliament must respect the constitutional 
protection afforded commercial expression,358 there exists limited justification for its 
protection in the context of children’s food advertising. Children’s accepted vulnerability 
to advertising undermines the argument for protection on the basis of receivers’ rights to 
information. Moreover, article 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
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Child specifically contemplates the restriction of children’s freedom of expression in the 
interests of public health.359 In such circumstances, the protection of advertising does not 
comport with the traditional justifications for free speech.360 In light of these 
considerations, the limit’s effect upon the right of free expression in this context is minimal. 
 
Conversely, it may be suggested that adults’ continued exposure to unhealthy food and 
beverage advertising undermines the limit’s effectiveness and results in the 
disproportionate restriction of free expression. Some commentators believe the case for a 
ban on children’s advertising is weakened by parents’ influence upon children’s 
nutrition.361 Children’s consumption is accordingly moderated by parents acting within a 
‘gatekeeper’ capacity.362 As a result, restrictions focusing solely upon children’s marketing 
are suggested to have a limited impact upon obesity. However, this dissenting view 
overlooks the growing influence of children within modern households. The increasingly 
distant nature of modern familial structures has led children to wield a substantial degree 
of market power, both directly as consumers and indirectly through pester power.363 
Children may thus exert a disproportionate influence on household purchases. Moreover, 
the dissenting view fails to appreciate the role played by advertising in developing 
children’s food-related preferences and behaviours.364 These preferences become manifest 
in the consumption decisions of young consumers as they become independent. This future 
market potential is clearly apparent to advertisers. The non-recognition of advertising’s 
continuing effects therefore understates the harm mitigated by an advertising ban in 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertisements. 
 
  
359 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), art 13(2)(b). 
360 See Part III. 
361 See Chou, Rashad and Grossman, above n 2, at 617. 
362 See Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 33, at 26. 
363 See Lindstrom, above n 30, at 216.  
364 See Part II. 
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6 Summarising the case for justification 
Regardless of its critics, a ban on the advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to 
children is demonstrably justifiable. The tenuous evidence connecting food and beverage 
advertising to obesity suggests that the reduction in children’s advertising exposure 
effected by the ban would confer little practical benefit. This argument is reinforced by the 
ban’s limited coverage of non-traditional media. Notwithstanding this, the argument in 
favour of the ban’s justification remains strong. Children’s vulnerability to advertising and 
the externalities imposed by obesity underscore the ban’s importance. Its focus upon 
children’s food and beverage advertising is also directly connected to the objective of 
reducing children’s exposure to food and beverage advertising. The inadequacies of the 
existing self-regulatory approach and the questionable effectiveness of counter-advertising 
measures demonstrate the ban’s appropriateness. 
 
Whether the ban is considered proportional will ultimately turn on its form. Though the 
proportionality of the ban’s effect upon free expression is questionable, its limited focus 
upon the advertising of unhealthy foods and beverages to children substantially preserves 
both adults’ and children’s rights to receive information. On the current evidence, an 
indiscriminate ban on all unhealthy food and beverage advertising would be demonstrably 
disproportionate to the benefits derived from preserving adults’ expression. Whilst 
accepting this fact, this paper advances that narrower restrictions upon children’s 
advertising are justified given their particular vulnerability to food promotions. However, 
in the event that such restrictions are considered disproportionate, a less restrictive ban may 
ultimately prove more politically palatable.  
 
VII  Conclusion 
Obesity poses significant problems for New Zealand society. Children’s vulnerability to 
food promotions and the possible link between advertising and obesity underscore the need 
for stronger government anti-obesity policy. Nevertheless, questions remain over the 
constitutionality of advertising restrictions given their impingement upon free expression. 
This paper has shown that the theoretical justifications underlying the protection of 
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commercial expression result in a lower level of constitutional protection. While this 
provides greater scope for government intervention, New Zealand’s existing approach to 
advertising regulation has been industry-led. International attempts to impose statutory 
restrictions prove that the government’s stance on this issue should be more proactive. 
Moreover, a s 5 analysis illustrates that a ban on the advertising of unhealthy foods and 
beverages to children could be implemented consistently with the right to free expression 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
Despite these conclusions, the realpolitik of public health policy must inevitably temper 
calls for regulatory reform. The limited development of advertising regulations to date 
suggests that future developments remain contingent upon the interests of key 
stakeholders.365 Existing regulations have reflected stakeholders’ concern for advertising 
that is misleading and unethical in its approach.366 Given the importance of prevailing 
public opinion,367 it is not until there is social acceptance for stronger advertising 
regulations that the necessary change will occur. Oliver thus suggests that evidence alone 
will be insufficient to inspire government prioritisation of this issue.368 Rather, unhealthy 
food advertising “must be especially salient to important constituencies in order to 
overcome public ambivalence about governmental intervention into what are ordinarily 
private affairs.”369 
 
Even with political acceptance, the need for a more cooperative approach to regulation is 
clear. The WHO has suggested that states must integrate their advertising regulations in 
order to ensure more comprehensive coverage.370 In the absence of cooperation, the 
effectiveness of independent attempts by national governments to restrict unhealthy food 
advertising is likely to be minimal.371 Furthermore, the suggested advertising ban is not 
  
365 See Hawkes, above n 10, at 1969-1970. 
366 See Hawkes, above n 10, at 1970. 
367 See Bridget Kelly and others “Television Food Advertising to Children: the Extent and Nature of 
Exposure” (2007) 10(11) Public Health Nutrition 1234 at 1239. 
368 See Oliver, above n 304, at 198. 
369 See Oliver, above n 304, at 198. 
370 World Health Organisation, above n 9, at 5. 
371 See Caraher, Landon and Dalmeny, above n 243, at 604. 
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advanced as a panacea to the obesity epidemic. The evidence base has repeatedly 
underscored the multifaceted and dynamic nature of the obesity problem. However, change 
has to start somewhere. As one of the more easily controlled factors moderating the obesity 
epidemic, the implementation of marketing restrictions constitutes an important first step. 
The equivocal evidence of a link between food marketing and obesity demonstrates the 
potential for proactive government intervention to rebalance the obesity environment.  
 
If the current self-regulatory regime in New Zealand is seen as an experiment to help inform 
the future development of government policy, this experiment can be considered a failure. 
The theoretical incompatibility of industry self-regulation with a public health approach 
reveals the New Zealand Government’s misplaced faith in the self-regulation of 
advertising. Though political realities will ultimately be determinative of the government’s 
response to the obesity epidemic, the fact remains that the current system is unsuited to 
reducing children’s harmful exposure to unhealthy food and beverage advertising. Given 
children’s accepted vulnerability to advertising and the increasing social costs of obesity, 
the time has come to consider a ban on the advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to 
children as a justified means of battling the bulge. 
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